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TAO YUAN AIR BASE

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TAO YUAN AIR BASE

On 9 September 1958, Air Task Force Thirteen (P) was advised that 'Jonah Able' (F-104's) would arrive on 12 September 1958. After preliminary plans had been developed for the logistical support of the unit, a message arrived advising that the unit would arrive on 10 September 1958.

The first support aircraft arrived from Clark Air Base (Philippines) with support equipment at approximately 1400 hours, 10 September 1958. A small cadre of officers and airmen, including an aerial Port Team, with the all out effort of the Chinese Air Force, arranged to accept the first increment of the deployed units which arrived at approximately 2000 hours, 10 September 1958.

C-97's and C-124's, containing aircraft, equipment and personnel, continued to arrive at four hour intervals through 15 September 1958. Two hundred and sixty augmentation support personnel from Fifth Air Force had previously arrived on 14 September 1958. Tao Yuan was a complete crash program, as no prior logistical preparation had been accomplished.

Much of the support equipment, such as fire trucks, jeeps and oxb's from Fifth Air Force arrived in very poor condition. Supplies

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and other support items such as cots, blankets, sheets, etc., appeared to be adequate for field conditions. The Chinese Air Force Wing at Tao Yuan rendered magnificent support although their capability was limited. Only a small hangar and a quonset-type warehouse was made available to support the United States Air Force unit. No troop housing was provided except a small inadequate hostel. The primary deficiency was the insufficient lead time provided to permit proper preparation of support facilities.

Tao Yuan Air Base had not been scheduled to receive any units under Operations Plan 25-58. That base started out with very few facilities on hand. It was the most hurried of the crash projects due to the great urgency. Funded 341 projects totalled \$97,560.

FACILITIES MADE AVAILABLE BY CHINESE AIR FORCE.

Within their capabilities the Chinese were most cooperative in providing facilities. That aid was of great assistance in getting the troops accommodated during the difficult initial phase. The A.B.A.T.'s were of considerable assistance in monitoring the requests of the combat units for assistance and passing them on to the

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Chinese Air Force. Fortunately, good runways were in place. Specific facilities were: Runways, taxiways, handstands, revetments, navigational aids, hangar space, limited communications, power, POL source, munitions storage area, quonset building, limited hostel space, limited fire and crash services, limited refueling service.

SUPPORT FACILITY CONSTRUCTION AT TAO YUAN.

Basic construction was by local contractors using in some instances, local materials. Due to the press of time and lack of trained engineering personnel, plans and specifications were minimal. Frequent inspections during construction were necessary in order to get the job accomplished properly. The necessity for immediate construction precluded some of the normal administrative functions. That procedure necessitated a 'clean up' period for tying loose ends together and making sure all paper work was in order. In addition, follow-up programs would be required, such as winterization of the tents, installation of stoves, improvement of area layout, etc. Future construction will be documented prior to construction. Additional construction work was scheduled to be initiated at Tao Yuan.

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SUPPORT FACILITIES CONSTRUCTED AT TAO YUAN.

Support facilities constructed at Tao Yuan were: tent frames, latrines, dining hall, supply, well and water tank, tactical headquarters and personnel equipment, alert crew, aircraft maintenance. These items totaled \$97,560 of 341 funds.

PHASING OF CONSTRUCTION AT TAO YUAN.

The phasing of construction at Tao Yuan was begun on September 10, 1958 and would continue until completed. Construction was to be made for operational units in place and for support units in place. Cargo plane delivery of equipment was scheduled for delivery on 10 September 1958.

SUPPLY AT TAO YUAN.

The F-104 CASE unit was supported directly from the Zone of Interior under the Weapons Support Procedure.

The initial method of requisitioning on the Weapons System Procedure was by T&X, which was unreliable, slow and incompatible with current EAM-Electronic Data Processing System. On October 20, after detailed arrangements had been made by SAMAP, requisitions were processed via transceiver at Taipei direct to the

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Zone of Interior. Non-weapon system aircraft were supported from their home bases by T-4, radphone and courier service.

AIR RESUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS.

The F-104 deployed with a range of support spaces developed by past experiences at Hamilton Air Base. 100 aircraft were not programmed for overseas deployment. The support Table was only 60 percent complete upon deployment.

The initial F-104 AOC/ANFA rates were excessive. Early receipt of critical items by air, however, aided in reducing the rate well below the 21 rate. Commercial air parcel post for small packages was used extensively and effectively.

The air resupply system was not tested sufficiently under sustained combat conditions to accurately gauge effectiveness.

STATION AND HOUSEKEEPING SUPPORT.

Housekeeping supplies were shipped by SAMAP to each base with back-up stocks to the support supply point at Tainan. Common support items available in stocks at Tainan were distributed to the bases.

MISDIRECTED SHIPMENTS.

The lack of proper marking and labeling information, including

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geographical location information, delayed receipt of supplies from
SI sources.

Publication by SAMAP of a general guidance brochure including
address information, was of invaluable assistance in directing mis-
routed shipments to proper destination.

BASE FACILITIES.

<u>Storage Facilities</u>			
<u>Location</u>	<u>Barrels</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Type</u>
On Base	16,286	684,012	JP-4
Off Base	<u>43,000</u>	<u>1,806,000</u>	JP-4
TOTAL:	<u>59,286</u>	<u>2,490,012</u>	

<u>Fill Stands</u>		
<u>Number</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>GPM</u>
2	JP-4	150-200 each


MAINTENANCE.

The on-island transportation, augmented by CASEF and PACAF
air lift has been generally adequate.

Lack of vehicular transportation and support equipment was
initially acute, and in some cases remained so. Commercial con-
tract transportation proved effective between Tao Yuan and Taipei.

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
Lt. Col. Harold L. Brown, Commander, Tao Yuan Air Base.



Left to Right, Behind Desk: Major William C. Ratcliffe, Base Executive Officer; Lt. Col. Harold L. Brown, Base Commander; Major Anthony V. Scimeca, Materiel Officer. In front of Desk: M/Sgt Bobbie R. York.

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
Tent City, Tao Yuan Air Base.



Construction of Roads, Tao Yuan Air Base.

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Interior Shot of Non-Commissioned Officers' Tent,
Tac Yuan Air Base.

(Left to Right): M/Sgt B.R. York, First Sergeant;
M/Sgt H.M. Wagner; and Mr. W.T.F. Ward.



Group Shot of Supervisors: (Kneeling, Left to Right):
T/Sgt F. Berber, T/Sgt R. Kea, T/Sgt R. Kennedy;
(Standing, Left to Right): M/Sgt J.H. Terry, M/Sgt B.R.
York, M/Sgt F.C. Jones, M/Sgt E.C. Weisinger, and
M/Sgt H.M. Wagner.

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
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View of Chapel Tent, Tao Yuan Air Base.


(Left to Right): A/1C Lelan F. Haugen and 1st Sgt
Bobbie R. York.




Interior Shot of Tao Yuan PX.

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Motor pool Under Construction, Tainan Air Base.




Exterior View of New Operations Building
Taó Yuan Air Base.

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Construction of Latrine, Tao Yuan Air Base. Latrine Under Construction Shown in Background.



Digging of Well , Tao Yuan Air Base.

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First Sergeant, M/Sgt B.R. York, Joins
Serving Line at Noon Meal.


Tao Yuan Air Base.



T/Sgt R.R. Kennedy from 6041st Air
Base Group, Johnson Air Base, Japan,
Washing his Mess Kit in Rainwater,
as M/Sgt James H. Terry, NCCIC of
Mess Hall Looks On.

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Shot Taken in Kitchen of Mess Hall Showing Personnel Requisitioned from Different Air Bases to Compose the Food Service Squadron for Tao Yuan Air Base.




Personnel Washing Trays in Rainwater. Facing Camera is T/Sgt R.R. Kennedy.

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Interior View of Mess Hall at Noon Chow, Tao Yuan Air Base.



Men Being Served at Noon Chow. Personnel Serving are (Left to Right): A/2C Clarence Smith, 641st Food Service Squadron; A/2C James J. McDonald, 6214th Food Service Squadron; and A/2C James A. Nobie, also of the 6214th Food Service Squadron. Among those Being Served is Mr. W.T.T. Ward, third from left.

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
83rd Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Orderly Room Personnel.

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Major Leo D. Cave, Operations Officer (left), and Lt. Col. John W. Bennett, Commander (right), Standing Inside F-104 Hangar.


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83rd Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Tao Yuan Air Base. Left to Right: 1st Lt. P.B. Brady, Adjutant, F104A Starfighter Squadron and 1st Sgt Harold R. Tinervin. 133

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F 104 Hanger, Tao Yuan Air Base

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Working on Aircraft F102A are (left to right): Capt John Taylor, Maintenance Officer; M/Sgt Marshal Ritter, Maintenance Supervisor; A/2C E.L. Nevnich and A/1C D.C. Forrish, mechanics.

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Supply Area, F-104A Hangar.


Standing, left to right, A/2C C. Dunn, Capt. M.M. Cromevell, and T/Sgt Williams; seated, A/1C J.V. Shew.



F-104s on Flight Line.

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Flight Line. Aircraft Being Refueled.

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Midgets Inspecting F-104 After Flight.
(left to Right): Paul Wallen, Leroy Wentzei, and 1st Lt. G.E. Davis.

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


Pilots in Alert House on Chia-Yi Air Base.


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
Exterior View of Officers' Quarters
Tao Yuan Air Base.



Interior View of Officers' Quarters Showing One of the
Rooms.

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HSIN CHU AIR BASE

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HSIN CHU AIR BASE

BACKGROUND.

At a meeting at Tao Yuan on 14 September 1958, it was decided to survey the facilities at Hsin Chu and develop an air base complex with the capabilities of receiving a complete F-86D Squadron and support a base population of approximately 500 people. On 15 September 1958 a survey of Hsin Chu was conducted and a plan developed for building that facility. A group consisting of one officer, four installation men and six supply men arrived at Hsin Chu on 17 September to begin construction. A deadline was established to have the facility ready by 27 September, on which date 6 F-86's from Chai Yi moved into position and assumed alert status. On 29 September, 4 F-4J's of the Martin Unit at Ping Tung, arrived to assume alert commitments, on a rotational basis. That Martin Unit did not remain overnight until approximately 11 October when 4 F-4J's crews, and limited support personnel were stationed at Hsin Chu on a permanent basis.

The Chinese Air Force Wing at Hsin Chu provided magnificent support, both in aiding in construction of the air base facilities and rendering other logistical support. Two-thirds of a large hangar

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was made immediately available plus one building and three 30'x60' covered revetments. A hostel on the base capable of handling a minimum of 60 people was opened for the use of the United States Air Force. Only ten days was needed to construct that facility. As a result it was completely prepared to accept operational units when they arrived and to further sustain them in operation.

At Hsin Chu low construction costs were realized. A modern cement block latrine was constructed for \$3,872, or \$2.58 per square foot. A total of \$38,423 of 341 money was funded for that base.

FACILITIES MADE AVAILABLE BY CHINESE AIR FORCE.

Within their capabilities the Chinese were most cooperative in providing facilities. That was of great assistance in getting the troops accommodated during the difficult initial phase. The ABAT's were of considerable assistance in monitoring the requests of the combat units for assistance and passing them on to the Chinese Air Force. Fortunately, good runways were in place. Specific facilities were: runway, taxiways, hardstands, open revetments, officer hostel space, limited communications, limited fire and crash service, POL sources, power, water, and munitions storage space.

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SUPPORT FACILITY CONSTRUCTION.

Basic construction was by local contractors using, in some instances, local materials. Due to the press of time and lack of trained engineering personnel, plans and specifications were minimal. Inspections, frequently accomplished during construction, were necessary in order to get the job done. The necessity for immediate construction precluded some of the normal administrative niceties. That action necessitated a 'clean-up' period to insure all paper work was in order. In addition, follow-up programs are required, such as winterization of the tents, installation of stoves, improvement of area layouts, etc. All future projects will be fully documented before construction begins. Additional facilities were to be initiated at Hsin Chu on 17 September 1958.

SUPPORT FACILITIES CONSTRUCTED:

Support facilities constructed at Hsin Chu were tent pads and frames, latrines, kitchen, dining hall, water tank, tactical headquarters and personal equipment, alert crew shack, rehab revetment for kitchen, rocket storage, and supply. These items totaled \$38,423.00 of 341 funds.

PHASING OF CONSTRUCTION AT Hsin CHU.

The phasing of construction at Hsin Chu was begun September

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12, 1958 and would continue until completed. Construction was to be made for operational units in place and for support units in place. Construction was scheduled to begin on September 17, 1958 (approximate date). Cargo plane delivery of equipment was scheduled for September 22, 1958.

SUPPLY AT HSEIN CHU.

Aircraft Resupply.

The F-86D ACAF unit (6 aircraft) was supported directly from the unit's home base (Clark Air Base, Philippines). That aircraft was the same type currently assigned in the area, consequently considerable theater support capability existed.

Aircraft Resupply Effectiveness.

The F-86 AOCF/ANFE rate was well below normal and for extended periods of time was zero.

MATS backlogs at Travis Air Base delayed receipt of some priority items. The delay, however, did not appreciably affect the aircraft's in-commission rate. It was not possible to assess the act which would have been felt had these aircraft flown war time sortie rates.

The air resupply system was not tested sufficiently under

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sustained combat conditions to accurately gauge effectiveness.

STATION AND HOUSEKEEPING SUPPORT.

Housekeeping supplies were shipped by SAMAP to each base with back-up stocks to the support supply point at Tainan. Common support items available in stocks at Tainan were distributed to the base.

MISDIRECTED SHIPMENTS.

Lack of proper marking and labeling information, including geographical location information, delayed receipt of supplies from ZI sources.

Publication by SAMAP of a general guidance brochure, including address information was of invaluable assistance in directing misrouted shipments to proper destinations.

BASE FACILITIES.

Hsin Chu Air Base.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Barrels</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Type</u>
On Base	4,760	199,920	JP-4
	500	21,000	100/130
Off Base	14,280	599,760	JP-4
	13,090	549,780	100/130
	<u>1,190</u>	<u>49,980</u>	115/145
TOTAL:	33,820	1,420,440	

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Fill Stands.


<u>Number</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>GPM</u>
2	JP-4	200 each
1	100/130	250
1	115/145	250 (located at Storage Farm)

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SUPPLY.

The petroleum supply system on Taiwan is owned and controlled by the Chinese Government. Under the terms of the Rochester Agreement, the Chinese Government agreed to support the United States Air Force through their system when such support was within their capabilities and did not interfere with their mission requirements. The U.S. Air Force, therefore, does not own or operate any petroleum facilities on Taiwan, but utilizes the Chinese system which serves the Chinese Air Force.

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Major [Name], USAF, Co [Name]
1st Lt [Name], Deno. CAF

[Name], T/Sgt E. E. Buckmaster.

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
Exterior View of Day Room, Chin Chu Air Base.



Side View of Day Room. On Right Side of Picture are
26th Fighter Planes.

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Interior of Day Room
Chin Chu Air Base


(Above Building is formerly a Japanese Concrete Hangar).



Beer Stand Inside Day Room
Chin Chu Air Base


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Exterior View of Mess Hall, Chin Chu Air Base, formerly a Japanese "Betty" Concrete Hangar.




Interior View of Mess Hall.

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Men Eating Noon Meal Inside New Mess Hall, Chin Chu Air Base, formerly a "Betty" Concrete Hangar Built by the Japanese during World War II.

Two Views.




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Tent Construction in Chin Chu Air Base. Shown in Background is F100 Hangar.



First Refrigeration Unit Being Delivered to New Mess Hall.

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Interior Shot of Medical Room, Chin Chu Air Base.




Men Washing Mess Kits Outside of Mess Hall, Chin Chu Air Base.

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Two Views of Tent City at Chin Chu Air Base



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CHAI YI AIR BASE

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CHAI YI AIR BASE

BACKGROUND.

When the emergency started, Chai Yi had a rotational unit of F-86D's from Clark Air Base. These aircraft had been in place one month. On 4 September 1958, the F-100 unit came in to Chai Yi. There was a cadre of support personnel on the base at the time. However, a crash program was instituted to renovate barracks buildings and messing facilities. Tents and pads had to be erected, alert shacks, commander's building and radio buildings constructed to support the fighter unit. Subsequently, a segment of the F-86 unit was returned to Clark Air Base and six fighters were retained at Chai Yi until 27 September 1958, at which time these aircraft were transferred to Hsin Chu.

Support equipment to satisfy the expanded requirements was airlifted from Clark Air Base. Chai Yi was capable of accommodating United States Air Force aircraft as it had been used for rotational squadrons for the past two years. There had been no prior preparation to support more than one squadron. Most of the augmentation support personnel utilized were on TDY status from Fifth Air Force.

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Funded projects for Chia Yi totaled \$65,790 of 341 funds.

FACILITIES MADE AVAILABLE BY CHINESE AIR FORCE.

Within their capabilities the Chinese were most cooperative in providing facilities. That was of great assistance in getting the troops accommodated during the difficult initial phase. The ABAT's were of considerable assistance in monitoring the requests of the combat units for assistance and passing them on to the Chinese Air Force. Fortunately, good runways were in place. Specific facilities available at Chia Yi were: a runway, taxiways, hardstands, revetments, navigational aids, hangar, two warehouses, two barracks, two latrines, an administration building, dining hall space, limited communications, limited fire and crash service, power, POL supply, water, and a munitions storage area.

SUPPORT FACILITY CONSTRUCTION.

Basic construction was by local contractors using, in some instances, local materials. Due to the press of time and lack of trained personnel, plans and specifications were minimal. Inspection during construction was necessary in order to get the mission accomplished. The necessity for immediate construction precluded

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some of the normal administrative functions. Such actions necessitated a "clean up" period at a later date to see that all paper work was in order. In addition, follow-up programs were required, such as winterization of the tents, installation of stoves, improvement of area layouts, etc. All future construction projects are scheduled for full documentation before construction will begin. Construction of additional required facilities was initiated on 6-12 September.

SUPPORT FACILITIES CONSTRUCTED.

Support facilities constructed at Chai Yi were tent pads and frames, communications operations building, tactical headquarters, personal equipment building, an alert shack, rocket assembly, kitchen and dining hall. These items totalled \$65,790.00 of 341 funds.

PHASING OF CONSTRUCTION AT CHAI YI.

The phasing of construction at Chai Yi began on 1 September 1958 and would continue until completed. Construction was to be made for operational units in place and for support units in place. Cargo plane delivery of equipment began on 4 September 1958.

STATION AND HOUSEKEEPING SUPPORT.

SEAWEED assets in place at Chai Yi were used to advantage.

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Range of support as well as quantities were generally satisfactory for Chai Yi on an austere basis. No provisions were ever made, however, for additional Taiwan deployments.

Housekeeping supplies were shipped by SAMAP to each base with backup stocks to the support supply point at Tainan. Common support items available in stocks at Tainan were distributed to the base.

MISDIRECTED SHIPMENTS.

Lack of proper marking and labeling information, including geographical location information, delayed receipt of supplies from ZI sources.

BASE FACILITIES AT CHAI YI AIR BASE.

Storage Facilities

<u>Location</u>	<u>Barrels</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Type</u>
On Base	16,595	696,990	JF-4
	<u>1,190</u>	<u>40,980</u>	100/130
Total:	17,785	746,970	

<u>Number</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>GPM</u>
2	JP-4	150-200 each.
1	100/130	200 each

MAINTENANCE.

The PACAF deployed aircraft are maintained by the home base.

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The F-100 CASF aircraft are maintained by Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa. Engine changes, however, were accomplished in the field.

Vehicle maintenance was a serious problem. Contractual arrangements were made with Civil Air Transport to cover field maintenance at Tainan and Taipei. (Chai Yi for a while was considered an auxiliary base and was attached to Tainan). Contract coverage for generators was also arranged through Civil Air Transport.

TRANSPORTATION.

The on-island transportation, augmented by CASF and PACAF was considered generally adequate.

The lack of vehicular transportation and support equipment was initially acute, and remained so to a degree throughout the year.


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Commander Lt. Colonel G.M. Lamb Seated Behind His Desk at the Orderly Room, Chia Yi Air Base.




Group Shot of Supervisors: (Front Row, Left to Right): T/Sgt A.C. Bolen, POL; S/Sgt F.P. Pushard, Food Service; T/Sgt J.P. Necessary, Fire Dept.; S/Sgt J.T. Jones, Installations Engineering Office (IEO); and T/Sgt C.J. Rivet, IFO. (Back Row, Left to Right): M/Sgt Tyler, 1st Sgt; M/Sgt J.R. Watts, Motor Pool; S/Sgt M.M. Benbrook, Supply; T/Sgt J.R. Garrett, Ammunitions; T/Sgt R.W. Laabs, 507th Comm.; and T/Sgt C.J. Webber, Hospital

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Chia-Yi Air Base, 6214th Air Base Squadron, Orderly Room
Personnel: (Left to Right): A/2C F.D. Theis, Clerk;
A/1C C.W. Lindsey, Clerk; S/Sgt D.E. Vincent, Chief
Clerk; and M/Sgt G.F. Tyler, First Sergeant.




Interior Shot of 6214th Air Base Squadron Orderly
Room with (Left to Right): Lt. Col. G.M. Lamb and
M/Sgt G.F. Tyler.

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388th Tactical Fighter Squadron Mobile Dispensary

Left to Right: Lt. Col. G.M. Lamb and Mr. W.T.T. Ward.



Lt. Col. G.M. Lamb and A/1C J.C. Shields (Left to Right) Viewing Supplies Inside Medical Tent.

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


Installations Engineering Office (Tent)
1st Lieutenant Muriock, Installations Engineer.



Chow Hall at Chia-Yi Air Base.

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First Sergeant M/Sgt G.F. Tyler Inspecting One of the Airmen's and Non-Commissioned Officers' Bunks at Chia Yi Air Base.



Exterior View of Airmen's and Non-Commissioned Officers' Bunks at Chia Yi Air Base.

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A/2C Torrez Helping Himself with a Cup of Coffee
at the Back of Mess Hall, Chia-Yi Air Base.



Men Eating Outside the Mess Hall, Chia-Yi Air Base.

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
Chinese Girl Working on Latrine Under Construction
for Personnel of Chia-Yi Air Base.



Chia-Yi Air Base Viewed West of Medical Tent.

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
First Sergeant M/Sgt Tyler washing hands in latrine at one of the bunks in Chia-Yi Air Base. Water is not safe for drinking.



M/Sgt Tyler walking into another Airmen's bunk at Chia-Yi Air Base.

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
Interior View of F-100 Hangar, Chia-Yi Air Base.



Operations 388th Orderly Room (Tent). Seen in Background on Left Side is 312th Tactical Flying Wing.

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Left to Right: A/3C R.O. Leos, S/Sgt J. McIver,
A/2C J.P. Norwood, A/3C M.L. Fessler, A/1C J. Williams,
Capt. R. Desomer, A/1C A. Cioci, and 1st Lt J.C. Few.

Operations 338th Supply Personnel.



Left to Right: 1st Lt. J.C. Few, A/1C A. Cioci,
S/Sgt J. McIver, A/1C J. Williams, A/3C R.O. Leos,
A/2C J.P. Norwood, and Capt. R. Desomer.

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TAINAN AIR BASE

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TAINAN AIR BASE

BACKGROUND.

The 16th Fighter Squadron arrived at Tainan at 1400 hours, 29 August 1958. The unit equipment and personnel started to arrive the next day. All equipment was received in good condition.

Personnel were housed in the Martin Facility Building.

Latrine and shower facilities were constructed soon after the arrival of the squadron. An agreement was made between the 802d Engineers and the 6214th Air Base Group for the occupancy of newly constructed buildings upon completion. In the interim, additional TDY personnel were housed in the Supply building and mess hall. Base supply requests for beds and bedding were airlifted from SAMAP.

SEAWEEED equipment available at Tainan was shared with other bases until requested equipment arrived from SAMAP and Thirteenth Air Force. That project consisted mainly of vehicles and ground handling equipment. Special projects of that nature should be included in all future AF-MAAG plans.

The Chinese Air Force base at Tainan was readily able to

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accommodate USAF units since that base had been used for rotational units during the past two and one-half years.

\$62,900 of 341 money was funded for construction projects in addition to MCP projects under construction by Company A, 802d Engineer Battalion.

Construction of MCP items was unavoidably slowed by necessity of occupying existing buildings before they were completed. Many of the Butler buildings were corroded. They were of World War II vintage. Plastic toilets used in latrines had been in boxes since 1943 and were cracked and unsanitary. They were also of inferior design. Maintenance cost in the coming years should be high.

FACILITIES MADE AVAILABLE BY CHINESE AIR FORCE.

Within their capabilities the Chinese were most cooperative in providing facilities. That was of great assistance in getting the troops accommodated during the difficult initial phase. The ABAT's were of considerable assistance in monitoring the requests of the combat units for assistance and passing them on to the Chinese Air Force. Fortunately, good runways were in place. Specific facilities available at Tainan were: runways, taxiways, hard stands, revetments, navigational aids, hanger space, alert crew building, limited

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communications, power, POL supply, and maintenance storage areas.

SUPPLY FACILITY CONSTRUCTION.

Basic construction was by local contractors, using in some instances local materials. Due to the press of time and lack of trained engineering personnel, plans and specifications were minimal. Inspection during construction had to be done in order to properly accomplish the job. The necessity for immediate construction precluded many administration formalities. That action necessitated a "clean-up" period of making sure that all paper work was in order. In addition, follow-up programs are required, such as winterization of area layouts, etc. All future projects were being fully documented before construction began. Additional construction on needed facilities was in progress on 1 September 1958.

SUPPORT FACILITIES CONSTRUCTED.

Support facilities constructed at Tainan Air Base were Tactical Headquarters and personal equipment, rocket assembly, communication operations, motor pool operations, dining hall, tent frames and a dormitory. These items totaled \$62,900. of

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341 funds.

PHASING OF CONSTRUCTION AT TAINAN AIR BASE.

The phasing of construction at Tainan Air Base was in process on 1 September 1958 and would continue until completed. Construction was to be made for operational units in place and for support units in place. Cargo plane delivery of equipment was in operation 1 September 1958.

SUPPLY AT TAINAN AIR BASE.

The F-86D' PACAF unit received direct support from its home base in Naha.

As F-86D's were the type aircraft currently deployed in the area there was consequently, considerable theatre support capability.

AIR RESUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS.

The F-86 AOC/P/ANFE rates were well below normal, and for extended periods the rate was zero.

STATION AND HOUSEKEEPING SUPPORT.

Housekeeping supplies were shipped by SAMAP to each base with back-up stocks to the support supply point at Tainan. Common

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support items available were distributed to the base.

MISDIRECTED SHIPMENTS.

Lack of proper marking and labeling information, including geographical location information, delayed receipt of supplies from EI sources.

BASE FACILITIES AT TAINAN AIR BASE.

Storage Facilities.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Barrels</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Type</u>
On Base	14,760	619,920	115/145
Off Base	13,430	564,060	JP-4
TOTAL:	28,190	1,183,980	

Fill Stands

<u>No.</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>GPM</u>
2	JP-4	200-225 each
1	115/145	250

MAINTENANCE.

The PACAF deployed aircraft are maintained by the home base. Engine changes, however, were accomplished in the field.

Vehicle maintenance was a serious problem. Contractual arrangements were made with Civil Air Transport to cover field

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maintenance at Tainan and Taipei. Contract coverage for generators was also arranged through Civil Air Transport. The close association of CAT with the USAF effort was considered a unique asset on the island.


TRANSPORTATION.

The on-island transportation, augmented by CASF and PACAF aircraft was generally adequate.

Lack of vehicular transportation and support equipment was initially acute and in some cases still were, at the end of the year.

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Colonel Fling, Commander, Tainan Air Base. UNCLASSIFIED

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
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Colonel Fling, Commander, Tainan Air Base, Briefing Officers.

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


6214th Air Base Group Building, Tainan Air Base.

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
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6214th Air Base Group Office.

(Left to Right): A/2C John F. Neatie, Distribution Clerk; M/Sgt Donald H. McClellm, Information Services Officer.



6214th Air Base Group Office.

(Left to Right): Capt. S.T. Petroski, Administrative Officer; S/Sgt T.W. Tillman; A/2C J.H. Horton, Clearance Clerk.


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
Interior of Officers' Bunks at Tainan (104th Fighter Squadron).




Interior of Airmen's Bunks.

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Airmen In Pay Line.



Interior Shot of Library at Tainan.

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Interior Shot of New Chow Hall, Tainan Air Base.

Men in Background: (Left to Right): A/2C T.J. Ber-
nath, A/2C S.M. Jones, and SP5 C.B. Lewis.



Preparing Noon Meal are M/Sgt L.B. Goss, Non-Commis-
sioned Officer in Charge (left), and SP5 C.B. Lewis.

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Group Shot of Cooks in New Chow Hall, Tainan Air Base.

(Left to Right): SP5 C.B. Lewis, A/3C S.M. Jones,
A/2C T.J. Borbach, M/Sgt L.B. Goss (NCOIC), A/2C F.R.
Vowell, and S/Sgt L.H. Windham.




Preparing Noon Meal are from left to right: S/Sgt L.H.
Windham, M/Sgt L.B. Goss, SP5 C.B. Lewis, and A/3C S.M.
Jones.

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Construction of Roads at Tainan by Air Force Personnel.




Construction of Roads at Tainan by Army Personnel.

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Construction of Roads at Tainan by Air Force Personnel.



Construction of Roads at Tainan by Army Personnel.

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Tents of 25th Interceptor Squadron. Two Views.




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Officers of the 26th Fighter Squadron Relaxing in Day Room of Officers' Bunks, Tainan Air Base.



View Showing 26th Fighter Squadron Planes in Flight Line.

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Group Shot of Armament Section, 368th Tactical Missiles Squadron, Tainan Air Base.

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Captain in Charge - Captain Harold C. Colkins (first from left).

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A/1C R.D. Kaser and T/Sgt M.D. Underwood standing
in front of Missile Nose Cones.




Missiles Maintenance Shop

"Tainan", November 1, 1958.

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
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Men Working in Hangar

(Left to Right): A/1C A. B. Miller, M/Sgt D.R. Babcock, Jr., Capt. H. C. Calkins, A/1C J. B. Dana, T/Sgt M. D. Underwood.




Left Side of Maintenance Shop in Hangar


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Storage of Nose Cones in Hangar.



Chow Hall in Missile Field.

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Launching Pads, Tainan Air Base.




Missile Formation.


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Capt. H.C. Calkins (right) and an unidentified Lieutenant at the Missile Controls.



Missile Control Bunker.

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WU CHU AIR STATION
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WU CHI AIR STATION

The 507th Communications and Control Unit moved 26 miles from Taichung with the first equipment and personnel arriving on 18 September 1958. This organization was supposedly self-sufficient. After an inspection by this headquarters, it was found that many camp facilities were required. Vehicle equipment had to be furnished from Tainan. By the end of October the total required vehicles had not arrived, which caused shortage both at Tainan and Wu Chi. The camp was not located on a Chinese Air Force base, but had been built in a wood along the seacoast on Chinese government owned property. One of the deficiencies in the movement of this organization was the landing of C-124's on Kung Kwung, which was not an operational base. The last three C-124's had to land at Chai Yi and the equipment trucked 50 miles to the base. The C-130's utilized were able to land at Taichung Air Base.

The site was located on a large tidal flat extending about one mile at low tide. The water table was only four to six feet deep in this area. This made both water and sewage disposal problems

1. Commander's briefing - "Wu Chi Air Station"

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most difficult as it was difficult to get rid of the sewage without contaminating the water. Water at that area was also brackish at most depths. Water had to be hauled seven miles at that time. This was an example of the problems that could be caused by lack of engineering help in selecting sites. Construction included 41 tent pads and frames, a latrine, a water system, electric distribution system, two small buildings, and some sidewalks which was funded in the amount of \$35,694 from 341 Funds, and was roughly estimated at \$200. per man housed.

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REDEPLOYMENT

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REDEPLOYMENT

When the Taiwan situation reached such a state that withdrawal of United States forces seemed feasible, questions arose at high level as to the manner of accomplishing that deployment. On that issue there were differences of opinion between the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, (CINCPAC), and the Commander, United States Air Forces, Pacific (CINCPACAF), which were being worked out as the year ended. It was clear from the correspondence between those two officers that both recognized the unpredictability of the Chinese Communist action and both felt that the state of affairs on Taiwan did not justify continuing the current commitment of United States augmentation forces on Taiwan.¹

On 25 November 1958, General Kuter made certain proposals to CINCPAC which would constitute a systematic evacuation of Air Force elements from the Nationalist bastion. In the words of Admiral Felt, whom General Kuter quoted, the recommendations ". . . reflected the demonstrated capability of the Nationalist Air Force against recent opposition, absence of current need for escort of air resupply, improved air defense capability since introduction

1. Monograph, Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, 31 Dec 58, by A. C. O'Neill, p. 9.

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of Nike battalions and Sidewinder, and necessity for United States units to resume normal training and operation."

At the same time, Admiral Felt expressed concern over the "political-psychological aspects" of roll-up and his belief that the present relaxation of tension in the Straits was due in part to the United States and Government of the Republic of China (GRC) military posture.²

He anticipated that the phase-down would be exploited by the Reds as evidence that the United States was doing exactly as the Reds predicted, and he foresaw the possibility that the GRC would feel its military position weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

In view of these considerations, Admiral Felt believed it was expedient to improve the Nationalist Air Force, particularly in all-weather capability and to modernize it in other respects.

A significant paragraph in General Kuter's message of 25 November quoted Admiral Felt verbatim:

"In world opinion, prompt withdrawal of U.S. forces when no longer required is probably as convincing evidence of U.S. good intentions as prompt response to the emergency which established requirement for augmentation. In addition, withdrawal will re-establish capability for quick and dramatic response, if required by future emergency. In response to possible news media query, answer should be along the

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following lines: "In view of improved Chinese Nationalist defensive capability, the U.S. and GRC agree that certain U.S. units are not required in the Taiwan area. Consequently, some U.S. units will be redeployed during the next several months."

Admiral Felt stated General Kuter's view that since those actions could not take place without the knowledge of the Communists in any case, the Americans should seize the initiative by highly publicizing the redeployments.

Admiral Felt believed that withdrawal action should be carried out quickly and that world opinion would be more likely to favor the American side if "we did not make a production or 'country tour' out of it, but did keep the GRC fully informed." He then recommended the following schedule of redeployment of air units:

1. Units to be redeployed in December or as soon as possible:
 - a. TAC CASF F-104 units on Okinawa to the Continental United States.
 - b. PACAF F-86D elements from Taiwan to Clark Air Base, resuming normal rotation to Taiwan.
 - c. TAC CASF B-57 units on Okinawa to the Continental United States.
 - d. TAC CASF F-100D (one squadron) Okinawa to the Continental United States.

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2. Units to redeploy in accordance with PACAF requirements in support of redeployment outlined above:
 - a. TAC CASF KB-50, Clark-Okinawa to the Continental United States.
 - b. TAC CASF C-130's, Clark-Okinawa to the Continental United States.
3. Units to redeploy in February or as soon thereafter as possible:
 - a. TAC CASF CINCPACFLT MAG II, Taiwan to Japan.
 - b. CINCPACFLT MAG 13, Japan to Hawaii.
4. Recommended for transfer to the Chinese Air Force:
 - a. TAC CASF F-100D Sidewinder equipped aircraft and related equipment of the 388th Tactical Fighter Squadron currently on Taiwan. USAF personnel to be retained as necessary for transition training.
 - b. PACAF F-86D aircraft and equipment currently on Taiwan, together with pilot transition and related training with PACAF assistance. (Classified component of E-4 fire control system to be removed pending approval of release of information concerning them to the Nationalist Chinese).
 - c. TAC CASF RF-101. Transfer four RF-101's to CDJIAS, substituting four RF-100's now approved or as additional deletion RF-100 project not now feasible. (Sic).
 - d. PACAF C-119's. In absence of information from USAF, transport aircraft to replace C-47 and C-46 types.
5. To be retained on Taiwan:

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a. ADC F-104 element in view of psychological advantage and to retain strong defensive posture, until attainment by NCAF of satisfactory progress in NCAF transition to F-100D and F-86D's.

6. Other.

a. CASF GRG Mobile Radar -- Transfer to NCAF to remain in place on Quemoy.

b. Army-USAF Communications: Transfer equipment on hand to NCAF to correct deficiencies, TRC-24, etc.

c. Barracks, warehousing and other facilities, transfer to GRG in consonance with redeployment schedule with proviso that they be made available to U.S. forces in event they should be required in future augmentation.

In the second part of General Kuter's message conveying Admiral Felt's recommendations, the PACAF Commander advised that he had prepared a message to Headquarters, USAF, referring to those proposals and requesting early decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter.³

Signalizing the denouement of the Taiwan effort, while at the same time recognizing the possibility of resurgence of Communist hostilities, CINCPAC on 2 December sent to PACAF and to other components of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East, instructions on the release of information concerning the roll-up. The message directs that:⁴

3, 4. Ibid.

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"No public announcement of the phase-down of U.S. Forces on Taiwan will be made. Nemoovement of individual units . . . will be confirmed until . . . movement is under way and then only in answer to queries. The ultimate destination of units concerned will not be disclosed. COMUS-Japan and CINCPACAF, Philippines, will inform respective host governments of any movement of U.S. forces of concern to them in time to avoid embarrassment. The departure of U.S. units from Taiwan may be confirmed in answer to query with the following statement: 'In view of the improved Chinese Nationalist Force's capability, U.S. and GRC officials agree that the presence of this unit for the defense of Taiwan area is no longer required'."

The Taiwan Defense Command notified the Air Task Force Thirteen (P) on 2 December of its release to CINCPACAF of operational control of the 338th Tactical Fighter Squadron, effective 10 December 1958. The Taiwan-based command indicated in the same communication that it would retain control of the F-104's of the 93d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron and of the F-86D's of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron until further advised.

Two days later, on December 12, 1958, Air Task Force Thirteen (P) informed Thirteenth Air Force and Fifth Air Force that, effective upon the redeployment of the 338th Tactical Fighter Squadron from that area, it intended to deploy units of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons, to Chia Yi rather than to Tainan.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

When the shelling started on 23 August 1958, the Nationalist Chinese were caught completely by surprise, proved by the fact that they had to cancel two receptions that were scheduled for VIP's when the firing commenced.

The Nationalists immediately rallied to the support of their comrades and attempted to supply the island by naval convoy. The initial efforts were painfully unsuccessful due to insufficient training in the use of those vessels, insufficient training in loading and beaching of equipment, successful Chinese Communist artillery fire, the high seas and inclement weather¹

The next day, 24 August, the Communists resumed the massive artillery bombardments and struck the first air assaults against the off-shore islands. The Nationalist Chinese Defense Ministry reported the Red batteries fired 36,500 shells. Eight Chinese Communist war planes, probably Soviet-built MIG-17's strafed the islands at the southern end of the Taiwan Straits. Communist gunboats opened fire on Nationalist warships south of the beleaguered islands and the Nationalist ships retaliated.

On 25 August 1958 the Communists stepped up their assault

1. Briefing on the Taiwan Straits, 9 Dec 58.

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against the off-shore islands, while at the same time the Nationalists announced Chi-Nat patrols had intercepted and driven back two Red Chinese flotillas attempting an invasion of one of the islands of the Kinmen group.

The Chinese Communists, on 26 August, moved the major part of the Chi-Com fleet from the East Sea (Tung Hai) to Wenchow in Cheking. Part of the southbound vessels assembled at Samtanao, threatening the Nationalist-held island of Matsu, north of Fukien. Meanwhile, Chi-Com guns blazed at Kinmen in a 40-minute attack which sent 5,515 shells crashing into the 50 square mile island. The Communists continued to shell, and at times shifted the bombardment to Tatan and the Erhten Islands. On 28 August 1958, the Chinese Communist Government by a radio broadcast to the off-shore island, called on the Nationalist garrison to surrender and announced that the Chinese Communist Army was "determined to liberate the lawful Chinese territory and the off-shore islands." The United States officials denounced the proposed action and warned the Chinese Communists of the folly of an invasion.

NATIONALIST CHINESE RETALIATE.

On 1 September 1958, as the Red Chinese continued to shell the

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island, the Nationalist Chinese artillery bombarded the Communist Amoy and Wuyu islands for eight and a half hours. The Nationalists claimed the destruction of eight motor junks, three gunboats, one weather station, several pillboxes, and a sea wharf. Next day, 2 September 1958, in a 90-minute sea battle near Kinmen, Nationalist warships sank eleven Communist torpedo boats. That sea struggle was the biggest Chinese Nationalist-claimed sea victory since the shelling began on 23 August 1958. Thirty Nationalist soldiers were reported killed or wounded. The Communists were reported to have tried to cut off the supply route and end the Nationalists' attempt to reinforce the island complex. The landing ship, however, was forced to return to the Pescadores after discharging only 30 of the 300 men on board.

Both the United States and the Russians came out with statements supporting respectively, the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. Although the United States was not committed to defend the off-shore islands, it would no doubt have gone to the aid of the Nationalists had any invasion attempt been effected. On 2 September 1958, Pravda solidified the Soviet position considerably by saying: "The Soviet Union will give the Chinese People's

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Republic the necessary moral and material aid to its just struggle."

Chinese Communist shelling declined somewhat in the afternoon of 3 September 1958. The next day the Red Chinese declared a 12-mile territorial limit. All foreign ships and planes, without permission from Communist China, were warned to stay outside of the newly established limit. The United States Government refused to recognize the new territorial limit.

A two and one half day of silence in the off-shore island war was broken on 8 September 1958 when Chinese Communist coastal batteries blew up a Nationalist supply ship on the Kinmen beach. On the same day, Nationalist jet pilots reported shooting down five Communist MIG's without any Nationalist losses.

*7 Sent acc. by the
Kato Foundation*

UNITED STATES SHIPS ESCORT CONVOYS.

The active role of escorting Nationalist relief convoys taken by the United States forces started on 14 September 1958. The first operation was successful and the relief convoy was able to land fuel and supplies. The next attempts, which were without U.S. escorts, failed as the Chinese Reds opened intense fire on the convoys. The convey fled before unloading. The operation became so futile that Nationalist China was forced to airdrop supplies.

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Another engagement between aircraft of the combatants, occurring on 18 September 1958, netted five more MIG's. They were victims of the Nationalist Chinese F-86's.

In addition to the pronounced physical aid to the Nationalists, in mid-September diplomatic talks directly between the United States and the Chinese Communists were initiated at the Ambassador level in Warsaw, Poland. Another peaceful overture was sounded by the United States' Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to the effect that if a successful cease fire could be attained, there would be a possibility of reducing Nationalist forces on the islands. Those efforts toward agreement, coupled with the United Nations tabling on 24 September 1958 the Chinese Communist membership for another year, produced another incomplete aim of the Chinese Communists.²

On the same day, 24 September 1958, one of the largest aerial engagements occurred between the Nationalist Chinese and the Communist Chinese. In that encounter, of an estimated 100 Red aircraft aloft over the Taiwan Straits, ten were shot down, without the loss of any Nationalist planes.

In reporting the spectacular performance of the Nationalists

2. Ibid.

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fighter planes against the Chinese Communists, it was disclosed that four of the F-86F's taking part in the air battle of 24 September 1958 had each been equipped with two Sidewinder missiles. Aiming five of those weapons at the Communist aircraft, bulls' eyes were scored on four, sending each to earth.³

Associated Press dispatches of 30 September reported Chou En-Lai denouncing the United States for supplying the Nationalist Air Force with Sidewinder missiles and of threatening "powerful blows" in retaliation. Perhaps to the consternation of Red China's Premier, who might have expected a denial of his charges from the United States State Department, John Foster Dulles publicly confirmed the fact that the Chinese Air Force had been supplied with the heat-seeking air-to-air missile originally developed by the United States Navy and known to possess extraordinary accuracy.

On 5 October 1958, Khrushchev lost some of his sparkle on the Taiwan issue, particularly in reference to the commitment of Soviet troops. The concensus was that if the Chinese Communists increased their aggression, it would have been done with the distinct disapproval of the Soviet Union. At midnight the Chinese Communists proclaimed a seven day unilateral cease fire.⁴

3. Monograph, Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, 31 Dec 58, p. 38, by A. C. O'Neill.

4. Ibid

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The most interesting aspect of the cease fire was the alleged Chinese Communist motive behind extending the cease fire for two additional weeks. The Chinese Communist Defense Minister, in a statement on 13 October 1958 said that, "the two week extension . . . was for the purpose of observing the enemy reaction (presumably the United States) and allowing their compatriots on Kinmen to receive supplies (presumably the Chinese Nationalists). Just three days earlier, the Nationalists had shot down five MIG's. That provocative act elicited no hostile reaction. When United States warships allegedly violated the Mainland's territorial boundaries for the 35th time, according to the Chinese Communists, the Defense Minister solemnly stated, "Shelling must therefore be resumed as a measure of punishment." The renewal of shelling coincided with the arrival of U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles on Taiwan on 20 October 1958.⁵

The meeting which took place between Chiang Kai Shek and Mr. Dulles was thought to have gotten off on a bad start, but in a joint statement, both affirmed that Chiang's return to the Mainland would be made without force, and the United States hinted that Kinmen and Matsu would be defended if attacked.

5. Ibid.

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On 25 October, the Communists announced a cease fire against supply points on even days. That action did not preclude firing against other targets on those days, but total firing was reduced.

The first successful resupply since the resumption of firing was effected on 2 November, although there was little pressure on the Nationalists since they did not resort to air drops.⁶

In conclusion, the Chinese Communist long range objectives remained unchanged, but they knew: (1) The United States reacted swiftly to invasion threats and could be expected to do likewise in the future, and (2), the USSR would not become involved, at least for some time to come, unless the United States attacked the Mainland.

The latest opinion of the United States was that the Chinese Communist objective was "Yankee Go Home" campaign to remove United States influence from the Taiwan area, and eventually from Southeast Asia.

6. Ibid.

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LESSONS LEARNED

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LESSONS LEARNED

The old adage pertaining to warfare, that actual operations seldom follow the best laid plans, was definitely applicable to the Kinmen affair. Due to the lack of military crystal balls, unforeseen conditions and circumstances caused the deployment and preparation for action on the Taiwan Straits to be considerably different than that which had been planned for several years. The unforeseen circumstances, no doubt, would continue to rise in the future, but this does not mean that the United States Air Force must not continuously revise its plans to make them as realistic as possible, foreseeing as much of the unforeseen as possible. The United States Air Force learned many valuable lessons during the Kinmen affair, and these lessons should be incorporated into new plans.

The United States Air Force had anticipated that hostilities would include nuclear devices as the main demolition weapon. It was found, however, that probably the war, if started, would have had to begin with iron bombs. On looking at this in detail, the

1. Commander's Evaluation, ATF 13(P), on 30 Oct 58.

United States Air Force personnel realized that anything further than a limited use of iron bombs against the Chinese Communists would probably be futile and disastrous. As the situation developed, however, CINCPAC had to hurriedly develop such a concept, because TAC SEAWEEED assets could not support an iron bomb concept, nor could it accept the variety of forces made available. For example, auxiliary tanks, type II, which had a doubtful reliability for one flight only, were pre-stocked for the nuclear concept. The iron bomb concept required type III, which were operationally satisfactory for repetitive flights. SEAWEEED's assets authorized a token quantity of only 78 1,000 lb. bombs while the iron bomb concept presented a requirement for 5,000 of which 1,700 had to be shipped into Taiwan.²

In developing detailed appendices for carrying out such a concept, it became obvious that United States Forces were geared for only a limited iron bomb capability and were geared for nuclear war only.³

The iron bomb concept, as issued by CINCPAC, if implemented,

2. Ltr, informal, Colonel F.D. Shoemaker to Brigadier General E. S. Chickering, 26 November 1958 w/ 1 Enclosure, subject: Presentation.
3. Commander's Evaluation, ATF 13(P), 30 Oct 58.

would have violated principles of warfare. Operations would begin at a point of conflict on the ground and expand geographically as opposed to gaining air superiority, isolating and then attacking the battlefield. This was not illogical, however, in that the main objective was to keep the war as limited as possible. The plan recognized the need for advancing to nuclear warfare if political objectives were not being achieved. Further, in developing detailed operational plans, it became apparent that little or no military objective could be achieved by the use of iron bombs delivered by the meager forces available to carry out the iron bomb concept.

On examining the possible use of nuclear weapons against an invading force at Taiwan, American military personnel found a strategy not visualized in the war plan which probably would have been more successful and still kept the war limited. Attacking any part of Red China with nuclear weapons would have undoubtedly spread the war at a fast rate. However, the alternate use of atomic weapons solely against invading forces on the seas or on the beaches would have offered as good a chance as any of defending Taiwan from invasion and of precluding an atomic attack.

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People planning for the defense of Taiwan following the Kinmen Affair must recognize that the United States must either take a step backward in the art of warfare, or the policy makers must realize that nuclear weapons were no longer special weapons.⁴

One of the most vivid lessons learned, according to General Kuter, was that up to the time of the Taiwan crisis, "we have failed to convince our own government that we must be free to use suitable nuclear weapons at the onset of any conflict in order to counter the Communist strength." "There is nothing to be gained" he continued, "by haranguing this group on the fact that we could not play into the Communists' hand in any more effective fashion than by swapping HE strikes with him." The General pointed out that as recently as last spring in Exercise Vayubut, that even little Thailand recognized publicly the necessity of nuclear weapons to stop aggression by massive Communist forces. Further, it was fairly well known that SEATO planning also recognized the need for the employment of nuclear weapons.⁵

Some statistics from the Taiwan situation showed how insignificant USAF's HE operation would be. Based on established

4. Ibid.

5. Ltr, PACAF to IJAF, subj: Presentation at Zone of Interior Commanders' Conference, Nov. 58, 5 Dec 58, w/incl, Report on Taiwan Straits Situation.

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USAF war planning factors, to neutralize one airfield would require some four squadrons of F-100's, operating from Clark or Kadena Air Bases, or four squadrons of B-57's or 20 squadrons of F-101's, the type of aircraft available in the Pacific. This requirement would recur approximately every fourth day to sustain neutralization. On the same basis, the same job would require two B-36 aircraft every fourth day. Conservatively, there were some 230 Chinese Communist jet fighter interceptors located on airfields opposite Taiwan. The entire coastal area opposite Taiwan was also saturated with medium type anti-aircraft weapons. This combination defense would produce steady attrition in USAF forces. At the same time, USAF's effectiveness against the enemy would be pathetically little as the quick strike deterrent forces were consumed.⁶

General Kuter suggested that USAF begin stressing the kiloton tactical weapons. Up to that time, he pointed out, in the view of the National Security Council and probably in the public mind, all nuclear weapons were bracketted together as horrible weapons of mass destruction. He continued: "We have no intention to use multi-megaton weapons for selective retaliation in limited wars or isolated situations." But, "We are now denied the use of any

6. Ibid.

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suitable weapon because they are all bracketed together. We have to convince our policy makers awfully soon or admit that we built the wrong kind of Air Force for our democratic government."

Air Defense.

The United States Air Force had not planned on participating in the air defense of Taiwan to the extent that it actually did. Assuming responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan by the United States, including deployment of missile-equipped aircraft and units and additional ground environment, had not been envisaged prior to the Kiamen affair. As long as local authority for the use of nuclear weapons by United States Forces could not be provided, this appeared desirable. It permitted the Chinese Air Force to be available for immediate retaliatory attack, and this in turn provided a short period for the United States to decide whether or not to react with nuclear weapons. The planners believed that taking on the responsibility for air defense before hostilities began would be the most desirable course in the future. This responsibility would give a shaking down period, which would permit the air defense system to be effective by the time it was needed. This period would be several weeks at the best, or perhaps months, if the communications network

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were not previously installed and operating.

Due to Taiwan's proximity to the mainland, the air defense was limited regardless of quantity of equipment. After the strategists studied the various factors such as geography, weather, the enemy, and existing facilities, they believed that six squadrons of fighters, at least two all-weather, could be considered as adequate, and if the Nike Hercules proved as effective as the Army claimed, this number could be reduced.

The Chinese ground communications and other facilities had gradually improved over a period of years, due mainly to the improvement in effectiveness of personnel. The communications provided reasonable adequate coverage of Taiwan, but was physically vulnerable and had no backup. During the Kinmen Affair, the United States augmented the Chinese ground environment by two sets of radar, and personnel to operate and maintain them, plus augmentation personnel to the entire Chinese system. It was believed by the United States military that, in the event of hostilities, that good results would have been obtained if there had been adequate communications. The Chinese communications system was overloaded with its own traffic, and it accepted a tremendous lead by the U.S. Forces

7. Ibid

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while they were awaiting installation of United States communications equipment. Due to this situation, it was believed that the otherwise expedited good job would have probably been a miserable failure in the event of enemy all-out attack.⁸

CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

There was no single control of operations in this relatively small area. This, however, was changed during the Kimmen Affair, when CINCPAC established the Taiwan Defense Command as a subordinate unified command with responsibility of coordinating all operational activities in this area in the event of an iron bomb war, and with authority to resolve conflicts.

The Taiwan Defense Commander exercised his authority by two means. He immediately prepared an iron bomb plan in conjunction with the Seventh Fleet and Thirteenth Air Force. He designated the Combined Operations Center, which had representatives from all agencies concerned, to do the actual coordinating.

Also, plans called for the shift of control to pass from the Commander of the Tactical Defense Command to CINCPAC in the event of a nuclear war. It was believed by the Commander of

8. Ibid.

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Air Task Force Thirteen (P) that if the war could remain limited, even with the use of nuclear weapons, the control should not shift from Taiwan. The probability of this, however, was so small that present planning should continue to shift control from Taiwan to GEOP control authority as soon as it was planned to use the first nuclear weapon. This would protect the GEOP capability.

CHINESE AIR FORCE.

During the Kinmen affair, the Nationalist Chinese Air Force revealed that it was a fighting organization with considerable capability. Its air-to-air engagements were impressive. The pilots were aggressive and they showed they had had excellent training. Their use of the Sidewinder in combat showed that air-to-air tactics should henceforth be changed to accommodate this new weapon.⁹

Plans called for the use of the Chinese Air Force in Phase I only, to include photo reconnaissance. This plan should be changed to use the Chinese Air Force in Phase II. It should, however, continue its photo reconnaissance, participate in the day air defense of Taiwan, and its conventional bombing capability should be planned for. The Commander of Air Task Force Thirteen (P) said the present

9. Ibid.

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plans did not seem to recognize that there would be a requirement for clean-up activity where iron bombs would be more efficient than nuclear. In a nuclear war the Chinese Air Force could assist in saturating the enemy defenses, for escort, sweeps and diversion.

There were also certain deficiencies within the Chinese Air Force. It had no all-weather nor atomic capability. The old F-84G was on its way out of the inventory, and at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, modernization of the Chinese Air Force was to start immediately. This change would be an expensive bill in aircraft, base and communications improvement, but it should be supported at all levels.^{10.}

General Kuter, in his presentation to the Commanders' Conference at Patrick Air Base on 21 November 1958, made the following statement about the Chinese Air Force:¹¹

"The Chinese Air Force is the best of the MAP organizations in the Far East. They were well trained and well equipped. From 'Tiger' Wang and General Chen to the individual pilots, their motivations were the highest They were generous if not over-generous in accommodating our forces. In more than one instance Fred Dean had to step in to keep them from giving us their shirts. They had a fuel system, and air defense environment, a communications network, and a stock-

10. Ibid.

11. Ltr, PACAF to IIAF, Subj: Presentation at Zone of Interior Commander's Conference, November 1958, 5 Dec. 58 w/Incl Subj: Report on Taiwan Straits Situation.

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pile of iron bomb munitions. Although minimal in each case, they were in existence and provided a substantial advantage. Here we have the unique case of a MAP supported air force truly complementary and compatible with our force."

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE

The Americans overestimated the Chinese Communist Air Force, because it turned out to be an engima. The Chinese Communist pilots certainly did not present the overall capability which was expected, yet its ground environment system permitted reactions not only near penetrators but also on actual penetrations; intercepts were made, but the pilots seemed unaggressive and untrained.

It was felt, however, that the Chinese Communist Air Force should not be underestimated because a great improvement had been noted for several years, and continued improvement was expected.

In addition the Chinese Communist Air Force had undoubtedly learned as much air tactics as had the Americans as a result of the
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Kinmen Affair. Undoubtedly they were making adjustments.

The CHICOMS were probably most stunned in the bid for air superiority. Despite the impressive number of MIG 17's which had

12. Ibid.

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been moved into the coastal areas, the less capable F-86 persistently chalked up victories. That trend was soberly punctuated by the use of the Sidewinder infra-red missile used by the Nationalists in an encounter on 24 September. As a result the CHICOMS were denied
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air superiority.

OVERALL EVALUATION.

The rapid deployment of United States Air Force units to Taiwan probably limited hostilities to the Taiwan Straits. It appeared that the Chinese Communists were probing to test Nationalist Chinese and United States reaction. The CHINATS and the United States apparently passed the test. The CHICOMS would probably probe again at a later date.

The resultant exercise was considered well worth the expense. The exercise proved the United States Air Force could deploy fast and efficiently and weld several weapons systems from various commands into a single, effective, combat fighting force. The exercise revealed certain deficiencies in USAF's plans and operations. One major military factor was also brought to light. The iron bomb concept was so significant that the United States future course of political action might need to be modified.

13. Taiwan Straits Intelligence Briefing, 9 Dec 58.

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