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<i>Judith Koster</i>	6 Aug 62	<i>ARPA/OSD for Rand, Halperin</i>	
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1. Taiwan Straits Operation
2. 13th AF Historical Study
3. The Far East Crisis
4. Chinese Air Bases
5. Nationalist Chinese vs Communist Chinese
6. The Kinmen Affair
7. The Defense of Taiwan
8. Chinese Air Force

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TAIWAN STRAITS OPERATION

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**THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE HISTORICAL STUDY**

**TAIWAN STRAITS OPERATION**

**A special study on the role played by Thirteenth Air Force and the Augmentation Forces in the implementation of OPlan 25-58 during the recent Taiwan Straits Crisis.**

**Historical Office  
Office of Information Services  
Headquarters  
Thirteenth Air Force  
APO 74**

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## FOREWORD

The purpose of this study is to record in a single consolidated document the significant experiences acquired by the organizations and personnel of the Thirteenth Air Force who participated in the Taiwan Straits Operation.

It is believed that an accurate and comprehensive record of the successful deployment of effective air power — on extremely short notice — to a "crisis" area, provides extremely useful insights and lessons of tactics and techniques which may possibly be beneficial and valuable to other United States Air Force organizations under related circumstances.

As in many undertakings perfection is quite elusive and successfulness reflects various compromises. The present study is not an exception. However, the goal of comprehensively recording pertinent facts to illustrate the valuable operational experiences gained as a result of the emergency deployment of Air Force personnel, aircraft and equipment, during the course of the "crisis" itself, has been achieved.

The very valuable professional assistance of Mr. Walter Miles of the Fifth Air Force Historical Division, is gratefully acknowledged. Without his beneficial contributions, this study would not

have been possible. Acknowledged also is the cooperation of Mr. Arthur C. O'Neill who aided this study by furnishing necessary documents.

*W. T. T. Ward*  
W. T. T. WARD  
Historian  
Thirteenth Air Force

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THE FAR EAST CRISIS

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## **THE FAR EAST CRISIS**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.**

International tension in the Middle East had just been eased when a new and more serious crisis developed in the Far East. That crisis was initiated a decade ago with the expulsion of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces from the Chinese Mainland by the Communists, in cooperation with Russia and the world expansion policy of Communism.

After the collapse of his Government, Chiang with his army of 600,000 sought haven on Taiwan. His ambition since then has been to reconquer the Mainland, and in pursuance of that goal the Nationalist Chinese have retained the offshore island groups of Quemoy and Matsu to be used as stepping stones for the reconquest.

The United States, while it may have sympathized with the cause of Chiang, felt that the reconquest of the Mainland was impossible and that conquest of Taiwan and the offshore islands by the Communists was ultimate. Hence, American policy prior to 1950 was to deal gingerly with Chiang's ambition of reconquest. Communist aggression in Korea

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changed that policy, however, when it became evident that the Communists aimed at realizing expansion in the Far East by use of force. The United States Government re-evaluated the strategic importance of Taiwan in the light of new developments. The Nationalist stronghold came to be regarded as a vital link in the island chain which extended from the Aleutians south through Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines and Singapore and which constituted the free world's defense perimeter in the western Pacific.

Since 1949 there has been continuous coordinated psycho-social, political, economic and military campaigns against offshore islands by the Chinese Communists who issued strategic and tactical warnings regularly and frequently.

In 1949 the Chinese Communists first assaulted Kinmen and lost a bloody battle. The Chinese Nationalists claimed to have killed 15,000 Chinese Communists on that assault.

In 1950 with the Communist attack on Korea, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Straits to prevent clashes between the Communists and the Nationalists in the Taiwan Straits and to stop the Korean War from spreading. A new policy was

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taken in 1953 when the Eisenhower administration announced what was generally described as "unleashing Chiang" -- a policy which implicitly committed the United States to the fortunes of the Chiang Government and the territories it held.

On 23 September 1954, Chou En-lai said, and not for the first time, "It is imperative to liberate Taiwan and liquidate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group." That night the CHICOMS again raided Kinmen with a small force.

A week later, on 30 September 1954, the United States made a show of military strength in the Taiwan Straits. Four destroyers and a carrier visited the Tachens and the top military commander in the Pacific, Admiral Felix B. Stump, spent a day on the Tachens under carrier-fighter cover. Four days later, the CHICOMS began an artillery barrage of Kinmen, firing 5,000 shells the first day. The barrage continued for more than a month. (SECRET)

In 1955 the Communists launched a series of artillery bombardments as an apparent prelude to invasion. The United States reacted sharply to the Communist attack. Washington negotiated a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Nationalists which stated:

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"Each party recognizes that an armed attack on the West Pacific . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and declares that it would meet the common danger . . ."

Later on, Congress passed the Formosa Resolution which stated:

"The President . . . is authorized to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purposes of securing Formosa . . . (and its) related positions."

Chiang interpreted the Formosa Resolution as encouragement to reinforce his garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu. A steady military build-up began.


The United States commitment to defend Taiwan and related islands caused quite a stir among the Free World allies, but Communist pressure against the islands eased after the Formosa Resolution and the issue receded.

Four years later, on August 6, 1958, Khrushchev called on Mao Tse Tung for the renewal of the shelling on Kinmen. It was not surprising for the shelling of Kinmen to be resumed shortly thereafter. On 6 September 1958, Chou En-Lai repeated his statement about the unshakable determination to liberate Taiwan and the Penghu's. The very next day Khrushchev made a statement that "an attack against Red China would be tantamount to an attack against the Soviet Union."

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CRISIS AREA



**IMMEDIATE CRISIS AREA**



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RENEWAL OF CRISIS  
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## RENEWAL OF CRISIS

### PRELUDE TO RENEWAL OF CRISIS.

On 23 July 1958, in the midst of the Middle East crisis, Pacific Air Forces accurately estimated that most probably the next Communist threat would be in the Taiwan Straits area. (SECRET).

Based primarily upon PACAF intelligence estimates, Air Force units were alerted on 6 August 1958. At the same time, in an exchange of messages with Headquarters, United States Air Force, a request was made that a portion of Tactical Air Command's Combined Air Strike Force be alerted for possible deployment to the Pacific area. (SECRET)

Within a week following the Peking meeting in early August between Mao and Khrushchev, the Chicombs began moving MIG 17's into the new air fields opposite Taiwan. Chicom aircraft then began over-flying Kinmen and the Matsus. Following PACAF estimates and increased Chicom air activities, Headquarters, United States Air Force, alerted five Strategic Command B-47's on Guam. Night and all weather capabilities were further supplemented when one squadron of PACAF's B-57's was alerted on 21 August. (SECRET)

On 23 August 1958, the Air Force alerts were resoundingly

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justified when the Chinese Communists concentrated heavy artillery shelling on Kinmen.

The crisis in the Far East flared up anew on 23 August 1958, when the Chinese Communists stepped up a furious round-the-clock bombardment, the heaviest since the off-shore islands were first brought under fire in 1955. According to Nationalist Chinese sources, the Communist Chinese plastered Quemoy and its outposts with more than 41,000 rounds of high explosive shells, resulting in more than 229 Chinese military and civilian casualties.

The next day, 24 August 1958, the Communists resumed the massive artillery bombardments and struck the first air assaults against the off-shore islands. The Nationalist Chinese Defense Ministry reported the Red batteries fired 36,500 shells. Eight Red war planes, probably Soviet-built MIG-17's, strafed the Quemoy's at the southern end of the Taiwan Straits. Communist gunboats opened fire on Nationalist warships south of the Quemoy's and the Nationalist ships retaliated.

Russian-built Communist artillery continued to bombard Quemoy

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on 25 August. Two Nationalist landing supply transports (LST) carrying wounded soldiers from Quemoy were attacked. One LST was sunk but all personnel were removed. The other LST was damaged but it was towed to safety. The Red Air Force, which boasted possession of Soviet MIG-17 fighters, made its first assault on the islands bastions at the height of the third bombardment. That assault was followed by an eight-plane strafing raid on the islands. In the battle which ensued over the Quemoy islands, Nationalist sabre jet fighter planes shot down two Communist MIG's.

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REVIEW OF EVENTS  
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## REVIEW OF EVENTS SURROUNDING THE TAIWAN STRAITS AREA CRISIS

To review the events surrounding hostilities in the Taiwan Straits area it will be well to first look at the Chinese Communist objectives prior to the bombardment of the offshore islands.

Action in the Straits would:

a. Further Communism's aim for domination of the world.

b. Extend Chi-Com sphere of influence in Southeast Asia initially, but in other places as well. That sphere of influence included the following aspects:

1. Political.
2. Economical.
3. Commercial.
4. Cultural.

c. Possibly lead to membership in the United Nations.

d. Liberate offshore islands and Taiwan, and:

1. Gain USSR support for such a venture.
2. Test U.S. intentions to help the Nationalists.
3. Isolate Kinmen and cut supply lines.
4. Gain air superiority in the Straits.

United States Air Force Intelligence believed that the meeting which occurred late in July and early August between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Tse Tung saw developments firmed for the

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bombardment of the Kinmens. Certainly the Soviets pledged vigorous efforts in the United Nations question. It was likely, however, that the USSR was more eager to observe United States reaction than were the Chinese Communists.

Increasing resistance to Chi-Nats air intrusions was evidenced by the Chi-Coms on 28 July when two F-84's were shot down. In August Chi-Nat reconnaissance observed that previously unoccupied coastal airfields were bristling with MIG type aircraft. On 5 August Lung Chi and Swatow Nd were confirmed and occupied; on 17 August Tung Tien was confirmed; by early September, Ching Yong was confirmed. A total of over 180 Frescoes (MIG-17's) was estimated on airfields opposite Taiwan as a result of aerial photography.

On 21 August, Chi-Nats observed on Kinmen an unusual number of vehicle trips on the mainland. On the following day, 22 August 1958, vehicular activity was equally as intensive. The 'why's' of such increased activity were painfully clear on the 23d August. Chi-Com artillery laid 41,000 rounds on the island complex, catching the Nationalist Chinese so completely by surprise that two receptions for VIPs were scheduled at the time the firing commenced.

The Nationalist Chinese immediately rallied to the support of

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their comrades and attempted to resupply the island by naval convoy.

These initial efforts were greatly unsuccessful due to:

- a. Successful Chi-Com artillery interdiction.
- b. Insufficient training in the vessels used and insufficient training in the loading and beaching of equipment.
- c. High seas and inclement weather.

Both the United States and USSR came out with statements supporting respectively the Nationalist Chinese and the Communist Chinese. Although the United States was not committed to defend the offshore islands, it was presumed that the United States would come to the aid of the Nationalists if invasion attempts were launched.

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PLANNING

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**PLANNING**

On 16 July 1958, the Thirteenth Air Force began attempting to determine its capabilities for the defense of Taiwan. The United States Air Force expected the Communists to start a "brush fire" in that area. At that time the Thirteenth Air Force had old and inadequate plans, consisting of TDC 51-55, the Rochester Plan, a FEAF Plan, and its own outdated 13AF and ATF 13(P), 51-56 plans. In view of the situation, on 26 July, Thirteenth Air Force asked PACAF for guidance on the matter. On the same day the Thirteenth Air Force went into condition 5. Among other shortcomings was the requirement to have the CINCPAC Coordination Center - Philippines, in being, and the unclear command and control relationships which should exist if Thirteenth Air Force<sup>1</sup> became involved.

PACAF answered Thirteenth Air Force queries on 7 August 1958, saying that its 25 Plan was being staffed, with an estimated publication date of 15 August 1958. That guidance further outlined the concept, which included information about task forces of the Fifth Air Force and the Mobile Strike Force directive. The next

1. Ltr, Informal, Col F.D. Sheemaker to B/Gen E.S. Chickering, 26 Nov 58 w/l Incl, sub: Presentation

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day, on 16 August 1958, Thirteenth Air Force received PACAF's 25 plan in message form. With that information, Thirteenth Air Force proceeded to develop its own TAC-Atomic 25 Plan, and on 18 August 1958, the Thirteenth Air Force concept was forwarded to PACAF, on the same day PACAF's Interim Annex E was received by Thirteenth Air Force.

On 14 August 1958, Thirteenth Air Force messaged PACAF its basic plan, and the next day, PACAF approved the Thirteenth previously submitted plan of concept of operations. It was about 15 August 1958 when the possibility of a reduced TAC CASF X-RAY TANGO package began to shape up in the minds of the planners. By 20 August, Thirteenth's basic plan was completed and forwarded to PACAF. Three days later, the Chinese Communists began shelling Kinmen. On 26 August 1958, Thirteenth Air Force went into Condition 4. PACAF's basic Operations Plan 25-58 was received at Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters on 27 August 1958.

PACAF advised Thirteenth Air Force on 30 August 1958 that there would be a requirement for an iron-bomb concept and that CINCIPAC was developing such a concept, and the next day, Thirteenth forwarded its iron-bomb concept to PACAF for approval.

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Fourteen days later Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters received CINGPAC's Annex H, and again asked PACAF for guidance. On the same day, PACAF approved Thirteenth's approach on the subject. PACAF's Annex E was received on 29 September, and Thirteenth's concept was dispatched to PACAF on 9 October 1958. To complete the picture, PACAF's Annex N was received on 24 October and the Thirteenth Air Force concept was forwarded the same day.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF  
OPERATIONS PLAN 25-58  
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**CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATIONS PLAN 25-58**

In a statement at its beginning, the plan set forth the general circumstances under which the plan would be carried out, noting that it committed certain Thirteenth Air Force components to conduct tactical air operations in support of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) forces defending Taiwan and the Penghus.<sup>1</sup>

The general statement further explained that operations under the plan would be carried out in two and possibly three phases: Phase I: Patrol and Reconnaissance, (actually under way at the time of publication); Phase II, Defeat of the Attacking Forces, and Phase III, Expanded Air Operations against Communist China. The Third Phase, if implemented, would be conducted primarily by forces of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) supported by the Commander-in-Chief (CINCPAC), and component commands.

1. 13th AF OPlan 25-58.

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THE UNITED STATES  
PREPARES TO MEET THE CRISIS  
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### THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PREPARES TO MEET THE CRISIS

#### AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENTS.

The successful military neutralization of the off-shore islands and Taiwan, in particular, would require extensive use of air power, without control of air space, invasion, either by surface or airborne, would not be physically possible. The U.S. Air Force units stationed in the crisis area were immediately augmented.

Air Force deployments included 66 F-100's at Kadena Air Base, 15 F-100's at Clark Air Force Base, six F-100's from Clark were on rotation at Chai Yi, five B-47's were on alert at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, a B-57 squadron on alert at Johnson Air Base, Japan; 20 TM-61 Matadors were available at Taiwan. That deployment included 144 atomic capable aircraft and missiles in position from which they could support Taiwan. Only 16 of that number (11 percent of the total) were Navy aircraft aboard the carrier, Hancock. (SECRET)

On 25 August, PACAF requested <sup>1</sup>part of the Combined Air Strike Force X-Ray Tango package. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the deployment on 29 August. Alerted and prepared aircraft in the States

1. Ltr, PACAF to IIAF, subject: Presentation at Zone of Interior Commanders' Conference, November 1958, 5 Dec 58 w/1 incl.  
Subject: Report on Taiwan Straits Situation.

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began to move that same day. On 28 August the first augmentation aircraft arrived on Taiwan. Twenty-two F-86D aircraft deployed from Naha Air Base to Taiwan ready for combat. (SECRET)

Continuing analysis of the growing tension indicated that additional augmentation units would be required if the Taiwan contingency plan was to be implemented and still maintain EWP posture. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed PACAF to be prepared initially to conduct HE operations against the Chi-Coms. Although an impressive nuclear force was ready to go against the Chi-Coms, the PACAF HE capability was ineffective. (SECRET)

### CASF X-RAY TANGO.

On 30 August the CASF X-Ray Tango package, consisting of another F-100 squadron, a B-57 squadron, two C-130 squadrons, one-half of a tanker squadron and six RF-101's were requested. One SAC squadron was alerted, if needed, to implement the HE delivery capability against the Chinese Mainland at night or in bad weather. (SECRET).

### SITUATION AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1958.

One F-86D squadron at Naha was operational ready.  
MAG -11 was standing by at Atsugi, Japan.

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A B-57 squadron was on alert at Johnson Air Base, Japan  
5 B-57's were on alert at Anderson Air Base, Guam  
69 F-100's were at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa  
16 F-100's were at Clark Air Base, Philippines, with five  
on rotation at Chai Yi.  
16 F-100's (CASF 388th TFS) were en route to Clark Air  
Base. (SECRET)

On 2 September 1958, the JCS directed the deployment of the balance of CASF X-Ray Tango. No additional tankers were received. Approval, however, was given for one additional C-130 squadron. The B-57 request was disapproved. Deployments were accomplished in much the same manner as the initial package. The F-100's reached Okinawa in little less than four days. On 3 September the first squadron of 12 CASF F-100's, directed to deploy on 29 August, arrived at Clark Air Base. On 4 September six of those airplanes were equipped with Sidewinders and were deployed to Chai Yi. Those planes arrived on duty fourteen days after the shooting began and twelve days after initial PACAF request for that squadron. On 2 September, in addition to the balance of CASF X-Ray Tango, the JCS made 12 TAC F-101's and 12 ADC F-101's available for Taiwan support. The F-100~~s~~ airlift commenced on 8 September when the first C-124 departed Hamilton Air Force Base with the partially disassembled fighter

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with its pilot aboard. That first fighter was reassembled and operational at Taiwan on 12 September. All 12 F-104's were in place at Tao Yuan on 19 September. The first flight of F-101's, flying under their own power, arrived at Kadena Air Base on 11 September, some five days after the JCS deployment directive. All F-101's were in place on 12 September. (SECRET)

SITUATION AS OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1958.

Aircraft complements at Kadena Air Base had been increased by:

14 F-100's  
13 F-101's  
14 B-57's

Tao Yuan had 12 F-104's in place.  
Chai Yi had 15 F-100's in operation.  
F-86D's and TM-61's were at Taiwan.  
Clark Air Base had 22 F-100's.  
Anderson Air Base had five B-47's.  
MAG-11 was located at Ping Tung.  
There were 400 plus Nationalist aircraft.

Thus the United States Air Force had increased its forces to 183 atomic capable aircraft.

In all cases, a tactical unit aircraft, personnel equipment and supplies, arrived simultaneously, or during a short period subsequent to arrival of the initial element. Arrival of augmentation

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support type personnel at specific bases in some cases was prior to the tactical unit deployment date, while in other cases, augmentation personnel arrived several days subsequent to that date. Personnel readjustments between bases was accomplished as overages and shortages developed.<sup>2</sup>

The psychological effectiveness of American military forces was attained by the rapid deployment of potent augmentation. The deployment was not quite as rapid as was advertised. It is recalled that even the F-86D's at Kadena, an hour and a half flying time from Taiwan, waited through three days while decision making processes at Hickam Air Base and Pearl Harbor were being deliberated.

The first combat airplane from TAC's first CASF movement arrived in Taiwan 14 days after the shooting began. The Marine Air Group took a long time to get going but finally moved 56 combat aircraft, only 12 less than all of TAC and ADC's combat aircraft. The slowest movement was the Army's Nike battalion. It was not flown to Taiwan however, but was moved by surface transportation.<sup>3</sup>

2. Logistic Planning Support, Operations Plan 25/58 Briefing, 1 Nov 58.
3. Ltr, PACAF to 13AF, Subj: Presentation at Zone of Interior Commanders' Conference November 1958, 5 Dec 58 w/Incl, Subj: Report on Taiwan Straits Situation.

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On military consideration alone, it was important with USAF to check the facts as to the extent of USAF's augmentation. In giving the augmentation information to the Commander-in-Chief's presentation at Patrick Air Force Base on 21 November 1958, General Laurence S. Kuter said: "We must not be oversold on our propaganda concerning the actual combat augmentation that was achieved."

The United States Air Force had a total of 175 effective fighter type aircraft at the time the call for augmentation was made. A total of 42 was received from CASF which gave a 24 percent increase. Fifty B-57's were in TAC's inventory, and 14 were sent to Taiwan for an increase of 28 percent. The U.S. Air Force's overall offensive inventory was increased 25 percent. Considering both the offensive and defensive augmentation, a total of 66 aircraft were sent to Taiwan, which increased the overall inventory only 14 percent.

The number of aircraft involved was an increase of 18 percent in reconnaissance, 50 percent in transports and 91 percent in tankers.

General Kuter said: "I think it is obvious that the

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psychological impact of the augmentation forces, especially in the case of the 104's and the Sidewinders, was vastly out of proportion to the actual increase in military capability."

The dramatic use of the Sidewinder by the Chinese Air Force brilliantly underscored the requirements for modernization of the Air Forces that the United States Air Force relies upon for support in the Military Assistance Program. General Kuter concluded his briefing with this statement:

"I have been astonished that the Chi-Coms have not yet received Russian 'Sidewinders' as well as MIG 19's and 21's. I do not understand how the Russians dare leave the impression with any satellites they cannot at least duplicate our support."

The deployment, first of a reduced TAC CASF X-Ray Tango, and then of follow-on units, created some bad situations. The TAC/PACAF agreement was signed in May 1958. No plans, however, existed to absorb these forces on deployment to the Pacific Command. Actually, the PACAF Deployment Operations Plan was not received by Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters until 7 September, over a week after the units began to deploy. CASF units actually arrived faster than accommodations could be acquired. The initial unit deployments, including destinations,

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differed from the deployment schedule made during the May conference and for what was called for in TAC plans. The new scheduling not only confused Thirteenth Air Force, but also TAC, and created confusion later on in logistic support. It was interesting to note, however, that after all the confusion and changing, the final deployment differed very little from the original TAC/PACAF agreement. The following table shows where the individual units finally, after much juggling, were based:

## TAC FORCES

### TAC/PACAF AGREEMENT.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Air Base</u>	<u>Eventually Deployed</u>
2 - TFS F-100	Kadena Chia Yi	Kadena Chia Yi
1 - TBS B-57	Clark Clark	Kadena Kadena
1/2 Tac. Reccy	Clark	Clark + FA - 82 Kadena
1 Weapons Maint. Team	Clark	Kadena
3 TCS C-130	1 Clark 2 Ashiya	1 Clark 1 Ashiya
1 Tanker Squadron KB-50 J	Clark	7 Aircraft, Clark 3 Aircraft, Naha
1 Communications Element	Clark	Taiwan
1 Command Element	Clark	Augmentation 13th AF

No doubt all would have been better off had the original

4. Ltr, Informal, Col. G.D. Sheemaker to B/Gen. Chickering, 26 Nov 58 w/1 Incl. Subj: Presentation.

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agreement been followed.<sup>5</sup>

The wide dispersal of units and the different mission tasks prevented maintaining the CASF as a single operating force. Accordingly, after a meeting between General Burns, General Tacon, and General Pottenger, at Kadena Air Base, the CASF units were integrated, including the command element, into the command structure of the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element at Kadena, to service the Okinawa-based forces committed to the plan.

The need for that new command was questioned. General Moorman, Commander, Thirteenth Air Force said: "I am convinced that there must be local direction and supervision in form of a commander who looks after the units, controls and directs their training and operations, accomplishes liaison and arranges support with Headquarters, 313th Air Division and the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing. For the Iron Bomb War, the possibility of controlling these units directly from the Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Taipei was considered. I do not consider this practical for several reasons:

5. Ibid.

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- A. Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) (Sub-Unified Command) had operational control of only those units on Taiwan. Any arrangement should provide direct command and control by Thirteenth Air Force.
- B. Even though the major part of FRAG orders could be issued by the Joint Operations Center, other instructions would be provided at Okinawa (such as Air Rescue, flight planning, air refueling, etc.). A single message by local command laying on the requirement would reduce the communications load.
- C. It is undesirable to change command and control arrangements in the midst of battle. Establishment of the sub-unified command seems to make a change unavoidable (in going from iron bomb to nuclear war), but we should minimize this change as much as possible. For instance, the same command and control should be exercised over squadrons, regardless of the higher level command and control changes. Therefore, you should have the same lower headquarters elements in the iron bomb role as in the nuclear war".

The following chart shows the Thirteenth Air Force with its normal structure, and the next chart shows the structure after the command element at Kadana was established.

### PACIFIC AIR FORCES THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE

Air Task Force  
Thirteen (P)  
TM-61

6200th Air  
Base Wing  
F-86  
F-100

Marians Air  
Defense Division  
F-86

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PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE

Air Task Force Thirteen (P)	6200th Air Base Wing	Marianas Air Defense Division	Thirteenth AF Command Element
TM-61	F-86	F-86	F-100
F-86	F-100		F-101
F-100	RF-101		B-57
F-104	KB-50		KB-50
F-4D	C-130		C-130
F-J4			

26th FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON.

The quarterly deployment for two weeks of the 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron to Chai Yi was continued indefinitely at the outset of the Taiwan emergency. Defense posture of Taiwan was further augmented by deployment of a full fighter-interceptor squadron from Naha Air Base into Taiwan. In addition, the Marine Air Group (MAG) 11, was deployed to Ping Tung with two day fighter and one all-weather squadron complete with combat reporting center (CRC). As the defensive capability was concentrated on the southern end of Taiwan, the 26th FIS was subsequently moved to Tsin Chu and the Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Tainan furnished a night alert capability of six F-86D's into Tao Yuan to supplement the 83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron day capability. The 507th Combat Reporting Center set up at

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Tai Chung to further augment support of the Chinese radar system. Operational control of all defense forces was vested in General Fred Dean, Commander, Air Task Force Thirteen (P), as air component commander of the Taiwan Defense Command.<sup>6</sup>

## 16th FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON.

Explicit instructions to Fifth Air Force to deploy the 16th Fighter Squadron to Taiwan came from Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) on 28 August. A message received from the higher echelon on that date directed the movement and stipulated that operational control of the squadron should pass to the Thirteenth Air Force upon arrival in Taiwan.<sup>7</sup>

The message amplified the instructions by directing that prior to taking up operational duties, the pilots and controllers would be briefed on current rules of engagement as specified in PACAFR 255-2. The message further provided that the unit aircraft would be controlled only by United States personnel, and it also afforded detailed instructions on auxiliary fuel tanks and high explosive munitions for outfitting the aircraft. In addition, the message said that while Thirteenth Air Force would be

6. Ibid.

7. Monograph, "Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958" 31 Dec. 58 by Mr. A. C. O'Neill

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responsible for logistics, Fifth Air Force would furnish personnel and, equipment and services to augment that of the Thirteenth. Tainan Air Base, the message stipulated, was selected for the base for deployment.

Supplementing that message was another from PACAF the next day which authorized Fifth Air Force, in connection with the move of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Wing, to move any equipment and supplies deemed essential for the unit's support which Thirteenth Air Force might be unable to provide. That authority was granted in response to a query from Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force transmitted the day before. Fifth Air Force notified Thirteenth the following day, 29 August, that the unit was already in the process of moving.

The disposition of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was altered, as far as personnel was concerned, as the result of a request from the 313th Air Division on Okinawa to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for permission to rotate the squadron's personnel on Taiwan with that of the 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron still at Naha Air Base. The request applied to both combat-ready air crews and ground personnel, but it expressly excluded aircraft and support equipment.

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In asking permission to effectuate the rotation scheme, Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, Acting Commander of the 313th Air Division in the absence of General Dale O. Smith, pointed out that the period of rotation would be for approximately 30 days. The Deputy for Personnel, Fifth Air Force, Colonel Ernest B. Maxwell, granted the request of the 313th Air Division on 23 September 1958.

PACAF held Fifth Air Force responsible for the maintenance and supply support of the F-86D squadron at Tainan, although it stipulated that SEAWEED resources there would be used for the benefit of the CASF F-100D squadron at Chai-Yi Air Base.<sup>8</sup>

### RECONNAISSANCE FORCES.

The 17th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) was a day task force consisting of seven RF-101's, nine pilots and support personnel. The squadron arrived at Clark Air Base from Shaw Air Force Base on 5 September 1958. Except for air base support, the personnel of that detachment possessed and demonstrated the capability of independent operation,

8. Ibid

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administratively, logistically, and operationally, including the ability to process films.<sup>9</sup>

The 17th TRS was assigned 14 of the Operations Plan 25/58 targets. The personnel compiled and maintained target folders, completed necessary intelligence studies, mastered the PACAF intelligence reporting system and perfected squadron capability to accomplish the assigned tasks. Crews of the 17th TRS maintained an operationally ready posture, however, two aircraft suffered a mid-air collision on 12 October, resulting in the loss of one aircraft and one pilot. That organization photographed all airfields, both civil and military, in the Philippines and Taiwan.

The following table shows the number of sorties the 17th TRS made:<sup>10</sup>

Photo	31 *
Tactics	6
Navigation	1
Test	4
Transition	2

\*with three air refuelings.

Another able unit, the 20th Transportation Reconnaissance Squadron, consisting of eight pilots, six aircraft and a limited

9, 10. Ibid.

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number of maintenance personnel was in the theater prior to the deployment of CASF X-Ray Tango.

The 20th TRS was integrated into the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus (P), on 1 November 1958 as an integral part of Operations Plan 25-58, but was dependent upon Fifth Air Force for logistic support, including photo processing. The 20th TRS was assigned 29 targets of Operations Plan 25-58. The personnel compiled target folders, received intelligence training, including PACAF intelligence reporting.

Consisting of two day, one night, one weather, one ECM, and one atomic radiation detector, task forces, the 15th Transportation Reconnaissance Squadron (Composite), assigned to Fifth Air Force, was committed to Operations Plan 25-58. Operational control was to pass over to Thirteenth Air Force upon implementation of Phase II of Operations Plan 25-58. The two day units used RF-8F's, the night unit used RB-66C's, the weather unit had WB-66D's and the atomic unit used RB-57's. Until 1 November 1958, that composite organization was assigned 29 of Operations Plan 25-58's day targets, and all night targets. Day task forces were based at Kadena Air Base, while the night forces were based at Yokota Air Base, Japan. Deployment of

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the night task force to Kadena Air Base would have occurred upon implementation of Phase II of Operations Plan 25-58. Operational control of that composite organization did not pass to Thirteenth Air Force since Phase II was not implemented.

### KB-50 TANKER OPERATIONS.

Ten KB-50J tankers of the 4505th Air Refueling Wing were assigned to Clark Air Base in support of Operations Plan 25-58. The primary mission of that unit was to furnish air refueling service for F-100 and F-102 aircraft operating from Clark Air Base in the event of Operations Plan 25-58 implementation. Three refueling areas were designated, each requiring one primary and one spare tanker. The secondary mission of that unit was to conduct air refueling training for units based on Clark Air Base and Taiwan, utilizing one aircraft daily, commensurate with 70 percent in-commission rate.<sup>9</sup>

Three tankers were dispatched to Naha Air Base, Okinawa, and placed under the operational Control of the Command Element, Ryukyus (P), Kadena Air Base. These tankers were to be used for air refueling training of Okinawa based units and also to

9. D/F, 130DC to 130DO, Subject: Briefing Material for Presentation to General White, Chief of Staff, USAF, 9 Dec 58, w/Incl. Subject: KB-50 Tanker Operations - Operations Plan 25-58.

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release Fifth Air Force tankers from alert. One tanker was used daily for training, commensurate with a 70 percent in-commission rate. That detachment would also be available for air refueling of F-101's operating out of Okinawa in support of Operations Plan 25-58.

The following table shows statistics on some other units that participated in the defense of the Taiwan Straits:<sup>10</sup>

388th Tactical Fighter Squadron Sorties.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Familiarization	23
Deployment	64
Cross Country	49
CAP	53
Instruments	57
Test Hops	28
ADC	107
Night	17
Tactics	20
Bombing	74
GAR-8	8
Proficiency	1
CPM	35
MSQ	1
Navigation	1
Air-to-Air Refueling	32
Total:	590

83d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron Sorties.

Hot scrambles	6
Training	433

10. Ibid.

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## 83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron Sorties (Cont'd)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Test Hops	54
Transition and chase	<u>20</u>
Total:	513

## 499th Tactical Bomber Squadron Sorties.

Navigation	20
MSQ	3
X-C	11
Scrambles	5
IFM-Profile	6
Profile	8
60-2	7
LABS	40
Orientation	3
Test	15
Transition	6
Instrument	<u>4</u>
Total:	128

## 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron Sorties.

ADC	128
Tactics	25
LABS	9
Test	20
Gunnery	15
Navigation	1
Instrument	22
Formation	4
60-2	1
TOW	<u>2</u>
Total:	227

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522d Tactical Fighter Squadron Sorties.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Radar Navigation	11
LABS	16
Formation	3
HADB	13
Night	6
Tactics	2
Test	13
ADC	2
60-2	7
Profile	2
Orientation	12
Total:	190

4505th Air Refueling Sorties.

Instrument	1
Navigation	6
Test	4
Refueling	63
Total:	74

OTHER FORCES.

Lest the impression be given that United States Air Force units were the only armed forces of the United States on Taiwan, the fact is emphasized that the United States Army, Navy and Marines were well represented on the island and even among the Nationalist forces, sizable contingents of their naval aircraft were strategically distributed.

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CONFERENCES

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## CONFERENCES

An assembly of the highest commanders in the Pacific convened in Taipei on 22 and 23 September 1958, for consideration of urgent defense issues. That conference brought together Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, General Laurence S. Kuter, Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Admiral Wallace Beakley, Commander of the Seventh Fleet and Admiral Roland N. Smoot, Commander, Taiwan Defense Command. These high ranking officers met in the Office of the Defense Ministry with Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister Yu Ta-Wai and General (Tiger) Wang Shu Ming. Admiral Felt and General Kuter later conferred separately with Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek himself. Concerning these meetings, General Kuter made a statement at Fifth Air Force Headquarters en route back to Honolulu. In brief, General Kuter recalled that in 1955 he had urged finding a means of greatly increasing the military capability of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores and concurrently evacuating Matsu and Quemoy (Kinmen), because he regarded them as a great military liability. His recommendation, however, met

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with blunt rejection by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces in the Pacific, and later with a similar response from Admiral Felix B. Stump, Radford's  
1  
successor.

General Kuter thought the concept of establishing the GRC in Kinmen and the Matsus originated with Admiral Radford, probably in connection with President Eisenhower's advocacy in his first political campaign of "unleashing Chiang Kai Shek" and he believed that the Admiral continued to defend the idea as a matter of personal pride and professional opinion.  
2

General Kuter pointed out that he had since opposed that concept before General Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Secretary Donald R. Quarles and Mr. W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

In his interview with Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei at Taipei on 22 September 1958, he found that official inexorably resigned to the necessity of using the Nationalist Chinese Air Force in what Yu termed the "unfolding of a Greek tragedy" evolving from inevitable military action against Kinmen or the Matsus by the Communist Chinese.

1. Monograph, "Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958" 31 Dec 58, by A. C. O'Neill.
2. Ibid.

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Admiral Felt told General Kuter that Chiang Kai Shek on 23 September 1958 had discussed greater United States Air Force support to the Nationalist airdrops on Kinmen. "When the Gimo talked about psychological requirements" General Kuter added, "I believed he meant the entanglement of USAF aircraft and crews in the shooting war, not merely 'cheering up the troops.'"

On the issue of airlift support to the GRC, General Kuter's attitude was equally firm. His feeling was that efforts to resupply the beleaguered off-shore islands would cost many lives, and he wanted to give USAF crew members a fighting chance. For that reason he preferred that the aircraft airmen would fly be of the fighter rather than the transport type. "If we are going to accede to political pressure to expose USAF personnel and aircraft to Chinese Communist attack and fighters over Kinmen, I wish to do it in fighting aircraft so that our crews would have some chance of fighting back," General Kuter concluded.

Whatever the Generalissimo's intentions might have been at the time of the September conference, his response to questioning of news correspondents soon afterward expressed his attitude toward American support upon which he appeared to implicitly rely.

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His comments were evoked by an aspersive statement of Secretary Dulles as to the military value of the off-shore islands to Taiwan.

News reports emanating from Kaohsiung, Taiwan and Washington are reproduced herewith:

President Chiang Kai Shek expressed incredulity over the reports from Washington that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had said it would not be "wise or prudent" to keep Chiang's large forces on the islands if a dependable cease fire could be arranged.

"Mr Dulles must know," Chiang declared in an interview, "that it is only wishful thinking to ask the Chinese Communists for a cease fire."

"Granted that Mr. Dulles made the statement attributed to him," he added, "it would be only an unilateral declaration and my Government would be under no obligation to keep it."

"We have confidence that Mr. Dulles is sincere toward us and that he has faith in our cause," the President added.

Chiang said press reports indicated that Dulles aimed at a cease fire and to prevent the present battle for Quemoy from spreading.

"What he is quoted as having said seemed completely incompatible with our stand and does not sound like him."

"There seems to be implications at variance with his own earlier utterances on the subject."

Chiang said the determination of his government to hold on to Quemoy and the other off-shore islands has

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been made so amply evident that it was not necessary to cover the same ground again.

In response to a call from General Kuter to a conference on the Taiwan situation to be held at Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters in early November, General R. F. Burns, Commander, Fifth Air Force, asked Colonel Hanes, Colonel Helton and Colonel Maxwell, of his staff, to accompany him to Clark Air Base to join General Kuter and General Moorman.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of calling that conference, as General Kuter explained, was to enable him to prepare a presentation on the Taiwan crisis at a high level meeting in Washington later that month.

The meeting took place on 5, 6 and 7 November 1958 with Clark Air Base and John Hay Air Station as the locale. There, General Kuter received information from Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces, and the group reviewed the capabilities for the further conduct of Operations Plan 25-58. In the discussions that followed, the paramount issue was the employment of the iron bomb versus nuclear weapons, and the following conclusions were reached:

a. USAF posture could support only a few days of iron bomb operations.

3. Ibid.

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b. An iron bomb war could quickly dissipate USAF EWP capability.

c. Quick reaction time by CASF would be essential to the retention of an EWP posture.

d. Command channels and relationships must be pre-planned and clearly delineated for contingency operations.

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**AIR TASK FORCE THIRTEEN (P)**

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**HEADQUARTERS, AIR TASK FORCE THIRTEEN (P)**

Prior to 17 August 1958 there was established an operations, planning and requirement staff at Headquarters Air Task Force Thirteen (P) to perform overall operations and planning activities for the units on Taiwan. The Commander, Taiwan Air Base Group, and Commander, Tainan Air Base Group were responsible for the administrative and logistical activities of the respective areas.

After the above mentioned date the Air Task Force Thirteen (P) and the Air Force Section, MAAG, were amalgamated into a single headquarters under one commander with a single staff performing dual functions.<sup>1</sup>

The commander reported to the Thirteenth Air Force commander on unilateral United States Air Force activities including operational, administrative and logistical matters of United States Air Force units located on Taiwan. He reported directly to the Chief, MAAG, Taiwan on all Military Assistance Program (MAP) matters and to the C commander, <sup>Spell act</sup> ~~US~~ TDC/MAAG on all joint operations.

A small staff consisting of operations and intelligence was maintained at Taipei to assist the commander in exercising

1. Historical Report, Manpower & Organizational Requirements, 13ATF 13(P), 30 Oct 58.

operational control and preparing plans and requirements for USAF tactical units.

Administrative and logistical functions for all USAF units on Taiwan were the responsibility of the 6214th Air Base Group which had the additional duty as Deputy for Administration and Logistics, Headquarters, Air Task Force Thirteen (P).

The primary factor which prompted that organization was the lack of sufficient personnel to maintain an administrative and logistical support element at both Tainan and Taipei. Accordingly, the support element was established at Tainan where it could be most efficiently utilized.

That concept was based upon a peacetime requirement and a critical shortage of personnel spaces. Before that organization had the opportunity to operate under that concept, the Chinese Communists started blasting away at Quemoy and the group at Tainan was required to perform full time duty in establishing and controlling the augmented personnel and elements located on the island with no time for normal planning. The Air Force Section, MAAG, could not be utilized since the emergency placed an extremely heavy workload on its operations. In addition, the

facilities to combine the AFS, MAAG and the ATF 13(P) Headquarters under the emergency augmentation program were not available at either the Chinese Air Force site or at the Air Task Force Thirteen (P) compound. <sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, to augment the ATF 13 (P) staff, a logistical and administrative planning staff was established at Taipei, which provided for a conventional type headquarters that had a capability to operate as an integral unit. <sup>3</sup>

#### CONCEPT OF 6214th AIR BASE WING.

That group was designed to support a missile squadron, supply squadron, five air base squadrons and a communications squadron. The staff performed normal operational functions of a typical administrative and logistical group. <sup>4</sup>

#### CONCEPT OF U.S TAIWAN JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER.

That organization was responsible to coordinate, as directed by the Commander, USTDC, the land, sea and air components of the U.S. military forces operating in the Taiwan Straits. The Commander, ATF 13 (P) established through that center operational

2, 3, 4 - Ibid

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control of all U.S. military units and all other U.S. Air Force  
in the Taiwan area.<sup>5</sup>

5. Ibid

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PERSONNEL RESOURCES

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**PERSONNEL RESOURCES**

Thirteenth Air Force was not permanently manned to fight a limited war. However, Operations Plan 25-58 took cognizance of that fact, and provided means for augmentation of organic units. The latter part of August 1958 saw Thirteenth Air Force rapidly expanding to meet that new situation and undergoing a thorough reorganization in order to realign manpower resources resulting from the Pacific Air Forces Manpower Management Review of early 1958, at which time 400 military and 800 civilian spaces were lost, primarily in the support area. Thus in August, Thirteenth Air Force had an overstrength of some 500 airmen and 300 civilians whose Reduction in Force (RIF) was imminent. With the initial shelling of Kinmen on 23 August 1958 it immediately became apparent that maximum exploitation of Thirteenth's resources was necessary to implement Operations Plan 25-58.<sup>1</sup>

A program of maximum utilization was immediately started, which included off-base athletic programs, in which travel was involved, were discontinued, fermal leaves and passes curtailed, multi-shift operations were started to provide around-the-clock

1. Ltr, Informal, Col. F.D. Shoemaker to B/Gen. E.S. Chickering, 26 Nov 58 w/1 incl. Subj: Presentation.

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coverage for key staff offices, suspension of the reduction in force and retention of overages. Additionally, the tours of duty of all officers and airmen were involuntarily extended three months. That action affected about 500 people. A minimum 48-hour week was established for all military personnel, and civilians were worked overtime on high priority projects.

SHAKE-A-LEG.

The next phase involved a call for outside help. In some vital AFSC's Thirteenth Air Force was understrength. With the crisis 100 percent manning was required. The response to the plea for help was heeded by United States Air Force and Thirteenth benefited from the services of officers and airmen whose normal reporting date from the Zone of Interior was accelerated by as much as five months. Thirteenth also requested an increase of the crew ratio of the tactical squadrons. Whenever possible, Thirteenth relied upon authority to overhire civilian personnel rather than drain the Air Force military resources, and as of 31 October, there were 1,200 civilians within the command. The greatest assistance and know-how came through augmentation of military positions with temporary duty personnel. It was most

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gratifying how quickly Fifth Air Force and the 315th Air Division rallied to the call. Seventeen hundred officers and airmen were requested, and of those 1,100 arrived to strengthen Thirteenth Air Force. By November there were 4,780 persons within the command. That number was composed of 2,530 Combined Air Strike Force (CASF) personnel, 1,040 civilians, 990 augmentation personnel, and 220 permanent change of station (PCS) "shake-a-leg" military personnel from the Zone of Interior. The experience and capability of those people, particularly in the combat and technical fields, helped to achieve a good combat capability within a matter of days.<sup>2</sup>

## EXPLANATION OF MANPOWER - FORMER, CURRENT AND REQUIRED:

Requirements before 23 August 1958 were based upon activities of Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Task Force (P), in Taipei, with a minimum of support personnel at Taiwan Base Command to be responsible for services. The 6209th Air Base Squadron at Linkou acted as host for station support of the 6987th Radio Squadron Mobile, and the 6214th Air Base Group at Tainan supported the 868th Tactical Missile Squadron.

2. Ibid.

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A requirement later existed at Headquarters, Air Task Force Thirteen (P), to provide a logistical planning capability and a regular coordinating staff. Those functions were not included in the authorized Unit Manning Document as late as 30 October 1958. A requirement also increased at the 6214th Air Base Group, Tainan, due to the newly constructed facilities. The facilities afforded better capabilities to support island-wide activities of ATF 13(P). The present Unit Manning Document for the 6209th Air Base Squadron<sup>3</sup> remained relatively static.

The required manpower for Operations Plan 25-58 augmentation provided for an increase at Headquarters, Air Task Force Thirteen (P). All units of the 6214th Air Base Group were to receive augmentation and the establishment of support activities on operation locations at Chia Yi, Tao Yuan, Hsin Chu and Wu Chi, were also to benefit with personnel increases.

## DISPOSITION OF PERSONNEL AS OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1958.

<u>Place and Unit</u>	<u>Capacity Officers Airmen</u>		
<u>Taipei:</u>			
Det. 1, Thirteenth Air Force	Assigned	61	99
	TDY	77	110

3. Historical Report, Manpower & Organizational Requirements, 13ATF (P), 30 Oct 58.

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## DISPOSITION OF PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

<u>Place and Unit</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>
<u>Taipei (Cont'd)</u>			
6214th Communications Squadron	Assigned	5	195
	TDY	3	12
6209th Air Base Squadron	Assigned	12	196
	TDY	1	12
6987th Radio Squadron Mobile	Assigned	10	450
<u>Tao Yuan Air Base</u>			
Det. 2, 6214th Communications Sq.	Assigned	11	196
Other	Assigned	4	61
83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron	Assigned	33	213
<u>Hsin Chu Air Base</u>			
6214th Air Base Group	Assigned	15	115
<u>Taichung Air Base</u>			
507th Communications & Control Group	Assigned	16	158
<u>Chai Yi Air Base.</u>			
6214th Air Base Group	Assigned	2	10
	Attached	6	130
388th Tactical Fighter Squadron	Assigned	24	122
Other	Assigned	7	88
<u>Tainan.</u>			
6214th Air Base Group	Assigned	58	777
	Attached	30	308
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron	Assigned	36	152

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DEPENDENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS  
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## DEPENDENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to the Kinnmen Affair, Taiwan had an off-island communications system supplied mainly by the Chinese and certain United States Army Signal Corps detachments. That communications system was meager, antiquated and overloaded with Chinese traffic. The U.S. defense communications plans for major improvement had been refused as being too costly.<sup>1</sup>

Two communications conferences had been held earlier in 1958. One conference which had been held at Fuchu Air Station on 23/25 April, had established requirements for permanent communications in support of Taipei, Linkou and Tainan. The second conference held on 7/9 May at John Hay Air Station, established requirements for off-island voice and teletype circuits. These conferences provided a basis for expansion when the crisis began anew.<sup>2</sup>

Five days prior to the renewal of the crisis and in anticipation of an attack, the Chief of the Air Force Section, Military Aid Advisory Group, and the Commander, Air Task Force Thirteen (P), gave three communications officers and one airman the task of drawing up plans

1. Commander's Evaluation, ATF13(P), 29 Oct 58.
2. Study, Dependence on Communications by ATF 13(P), 29 Oct 58.

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for the improvement of the communications system.

To provide common user communications on-island and off-shore island, the Communications Section, Taiwan, was reorganized under the Commander of the United States Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Aid Advisory Group, which was composed primarily of Signal Corps personnel. The 6214th Communications Squadron was organized on 16 August 1958 at Taipei, and was designed so that it could be transferred to the Airways and Air Communications Service when directed by higher authority. That unit was placed under the administration of the 6214th Air Base Group at Tainan. Later, on 2 September 1958 it was placed under the operational control of the 1961st AACS Squadron at Clark Air Base. The mission of the new squadron was to provide communications in support of Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Task Force (P), and the United States section of the Joint Operations Center (JOC).<sup>3</sup>

Communications personnel were also authorized to operate all permanent communications installed at Liakou Air Station and Tainan Air Base. Communications in support of deployed units were provided by the 5th Communications Group, Kadena Air Base, by deployment of detachments to the appropriate bases in support of deployed tactical units.

3. Study, Dependence on Communications, by ATF 13(P), 29 Oct 58.

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The first immediate result of the outbreak of hostilities was an increase by approximately 1,000 percent in the number of messages handled. Immediate plans were made for expanding the communications system.

In order to provide the additional communications, radar, and navigational aids required for U.S. defense operations, a total of approximately 800 tons of Army equipment valued at \$4,000,000 and Air Force equipment valued at \$2,000,000 were airlifted to Taiwan during September and October.<sup>4</sup>

The expansion of the Army communications system involved replacement of 4-channel teletype systems to Tokyo and Clark Air Base with a 16-channel teletype and a 2-channel voice single side-band system to each location. In addition, the Army expanded the Signal Corps TRC-24 down-island voice and teletype communications system from 12 to 24-voice channels. A requirement was also approved for the Signal Corps to install a 23-voice channel TAC-29 carrier system down-island.

To provide additional voice circuits, Air Task Force Thirteen (F) asked the 5th Communications Group to plan a United States Air Force tactical down-island communications system utilizing its own

4. Ibid.

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personnel and TRC-24 equipment. During the first two weeks of September, detachments of the 5th Communications Group were deployed to Taoyuan and Hsinchu to support deployed tactical units by providing base communications. On 18 September the 5th Communications Group was directed to provide personnel and equipment to the 2d Radio Relay Squadron to install and operate a U.S. Air Force tactical down-island telephone and teletype communications system. Elements of the 2d Radio Relay Squadron began arriving at Taiwan on 30 September and installed a complete TRC-24 system from Shihmen to Kao-Hsiung by 25 October 1958 with a capacity of 12-voice channels. Requirements of the Marine Aircraft Group II at Pingtung and the Marine Air Control and Warning Squadron I, were integrated into the system. In addition to resources of the 5th Communications Group, personnel and equipment of the 6209th Air Base Squadron at Linkou were utilized together with resources of the 507th Communications and Control Group at Chiayi and Tainan.<sup>5</sup>

The 507th Communications and Control Group had been airlifted from Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, and was part of the Composite Air Strike Force. The airlift consisted of 14 C-119 and three C-124 loads which included a complete radar station consisting of a mobile search radar set MPS-11 and a mobile search radar set

5. Ibid.

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MPS-11 and a mobile height finder MPS-14. That radar station was placed in operation on 6 October 1958 in the vicinity of Taichung as an alternate control and reporting center. (CRC).

During the first part of September, detachments of the 1st Shoran Beacon Squadron from Johnson Air Base, Japan, was deployed to Taiwan to survey for the establishment of a shoran bombing capability from Taiwan over the Mainland. Plans were also initiated for the use of MBO-1a radar sets of the 868th Tactical Missile Squadron for control of fighter and bomber aircraft when not utilized for control of Matador missiles.<sup>6</sup>

By mid-September the requirement was established by Pacific Air Forces for converting the off-island teletype circuits of Air Task Force Thirteen (P) from full duplex single channel operation to 4-teletype channels from Taipei to Clark Air Base and to Kadana Air Base. In addition, the United States Air Force approved the installation of a 6-channel teletype and 2-channel voice single sideband system between Taipei and Kadana. *See p. 65*

The communications circuits increased in number from 25 on 23 August 1958 to 200 by 25 October 1958. That number included 120 voice and 30 teletype on-island circuits and 20 voice and 30 teletype off-island circuits. The operational immediate traffic was 12 times the volume in

6. Ibid.

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October than it was in July.

Five officers and 64 airmen from the 1st AACS Squadron Mobile arrived in Taiwan to augment the air traffic control system. These personnel were placed at Taipei International Airport, the Air Route Traffic Control Center in Taipei and each air base on the island that was partially manned by U.S. forces.

From the total permanent strength of 261 C-2 personnel authorizations of 23 August 1958 a total of 655 personnel arrived on temporary duty to operate the communications system and provide ACG and ATC augmentation. Plans were made in late October for the permanent augmentation required by AACS and PACAF to support the communications system required for the tactical operations on Taiwan.

The AACS installed approximately \$1,000,000 worth of the latest type of communications equipment to support ATF 13 (P) and JOC. There was no adequate building, however, where that equipment could be utilized economically. In addition, there was no building for housing a dial telephone system which had been approved by higher authority. Plans were made to install that system however, within the following six months. Until that time, communications would continue to be on an interim basis.

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In summarizing, during late November, communications throughout the whole Taiwan crisis, Thirteenth Air Force said the circuitry efficiency on the Taiwan circuit rose immediately in August to meet the crisis and maintained its best performance, an average of 65 percent for two months. That percent was not bad for the radio path, but still too low for the volume of traffic. The abrupt fall-off while the new equipment was being installed was attributed to shut-downs and installation problems experienced during the change over to new equipment. The tie-in to the 40 kilowatt ACAN system during mid-October boosted reliability and the circuit was expected to average around 85-90 percent when fully operational.

Inspection of the monthly performance for the other PACAF circuits indicated a better than average picture. The Hickam circuit held about 75 percent effectiveness. The same was true for Okinawa. The AACS circuits to Japan, using multiplex, gave excellent results on the average, but the Guam circuit held the best performance record of any.

Thirteenth Air Force urged the immediate activation of a PACAF mobile communications and control group. Such an activation would provide pre-positioned communications task forces with modern

7. Presentation for General Kuter, by 13th AF Staff Sections, Nov. 1958

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hi-powered equipment.

The Thirteenth Air Force also recommended that spare crypto equipment, teletype machines and other communications equipment be stockpiled on Taiwan so that Air Task Force Thirteen could meet the mission of the PACAF Mobile Strike Force concept.<sup>8</sup>

For a picture of the communications situation in the whole Pacific area, General Kuter, no doubt, presented the most graphic picture in the following words:

In the vast Pacific area there are many hours each day when PACAF cannot talk to its units. During the Taiwan tensions, we have recorded periods of 6 to 8 hours where communications between vital units at Clark, Taiwan, or Okinawa, were completely out. We have also recorded numerous instances where communications system was so overburdened that essential instructions were delayed excessively. For example, our F-86D squadron learned through insecure talk by open phone that for three hours the Fifth Air Force had had PACAF orders for the F-86D's to move. They then moved in four hours and were in position and operational ten hours before their movement orders finally arrived -- and, incidentally, before TAD or their host base knew they were coming.

To compound the long line of communications problems, the Hard Tack test revealed that a high altitude nuclear blast along or near a radio path can disrupt communications from 10 to 15 hours. The Taiwan contingency brought two major points concerning our communications into extremely sharp focus: (1) How adequate our present communications are, and (2) How hamstrung we are both

8. Ibid.

9. Ltr, PACAF to USAF, Subject: Presentation at Zone of Interior Commander's Conference November 1958, 5 Dec 58 w/1 Incl, Subject: Report on Taiwan Straits Situation.

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operationally and support-wise when we don't have reliable communications. This is one of the grimmest conclusions we have drawn to date.

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## LOGISTICS

Manpower austerity had reduced Air Task Force Thirteen (P) to a point where it did not have the staff and organization to cope with any new deployment within Taiwan. It was an easy task to fly in combat units without organic support, neither was it difficult to fly in additional personnel and set up housekeeping. The logistic system of the United States Air Force was complicated and constantly changing, however, and it took more than common sense to make it work. Experienced material personnel at all levels was a must, but Air Task Force Thirteen did not possess sufficient talent to analyze and request. Outside help was sought and used to analyze needed logistics for the crisis period. Fortunately, United States Air Force sent trained personnel to Taiwan and as a result, on-the-spot Air Force personnel gained logistics experience. The lesson in point, however, was that highly qualified personnel is needed on the spot or should be brought in immediately in the event of rapid deployment to an isolated area.<sup>1</sup>

Logistic planning prior to the crisis was limited to the support of rotational units only at Tainan and Chai Yi. At the beginning of

1. Commander's Evaluation, ATF 13(P), 1 Dec 58.

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the crisis therefore, Air Task Force Thirteen leaned heavily on Thirteenth Air Force for logistic planning guidance. SEAWEEED stocks were maintained at Chai Yi for utilization of tactical units in future deployments. A small housekeeping cadre was maintained for servicing rotational units. The rapidly developing situation did not provide time for detailed plans on the part of Air Task Force Thirteen. No detailed planning had been done in support of Operations Plan 25-58 prior to the arrival of the first tactical unit on 29 August. No actions were taken without due command caution. Support action, however, had been accomplished for the support of the Tactical Missile Squadron at Taiwan, and a major construction project of support facilities was in progress.<sup>2</sup>

The Kiamen Affair proved that the days of the bare strip operation were over. A unit could no longer move on to a bare strip and begin operations. Even the Marine Air Group, which was supposedly completely mobile and had everything necessary, including portable fuel storage, to move on to an airfield and operate, found that it was dependent upon an operating base complete with utilities and communications.

2. Logistics Planning Support, Operations Plan 25-58 Briefing, 1 Nov 58.

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To support Taiwan deployments, material was taken from SEAWEEED stocks from the squadron there and in some instances from reparable salvage stocks. For example, to Tao Yuan were sent leaking tents, water trailers, crash tanks, refueling units that were in comparatively poor condition.

The SEAWEEED stocks which were utilized were not always in proper locations to support the necessary operation. They were moved at great cost by air and surface transportation in order to meet time schedules. For example, 3,500 aircraft auxiliary fuel tanks were moved from Korea and Japan to Okinawa and the Philippines. In diverting SEAWEEED stocks, prime consideration was given to maintaining some inviolate nuclear capability. F-100 auxiliary fuel tanks were a limiting factor. Each of these tanks was modified to correct aerodynamic deficiencies.

One important item future planners should not forget was that the Taiwan crisis was tailor made to ease the overall support and logistics task. The United States Air Force was able to move to an air base complex designed and constructed to American specifications. That complex was complete with an operating PCL.

3. PACAF to USAF, Subj: Presentation at Zone of Interior Commanders' Conference, Nov. 58, 5 Dec 58 w/1 Incl, Subj: Report on the Taiwan Straits Situation.

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system, with stockpiles of American iron bombs, and with limited warehousing and hangar facilities, all of which were made available to USAF units. Such would not be the case for a Southeast Asia operation. Logistics prestocking at some central point, such as Clark Air Base, should be absolutely essential in planning for any contingency in that area.<sup>4</sup>

Logistic plans should be adequately adjusted mainly to point up requirements for immediate development of logistic needs. Those plans should be the basis for developing facilities to be provided by the Chinese Air Force, to adjust SEAWEED stocks and to enlarge the POL system capabilities.<sup>5</sup>

The POL supply system on Taiwan was owned and controlled by the Chinese Government. Under the terms of the Rochester Agreement the CHINATS agreed to support the United States Air Force through its system when such support was within its capability and did not interfere with its mission requirements. The United States Air Force, therefore, did not own or operate any POL facilities on Taiwan.<sup>6</sup> For practical purposes the POL supply system could be divided into two parts, one for Southern Taiwan and one for Northern Taiwan. Keelung, located in Southern Taiwan was a primary water port for receiving bulk petroleum, and Keelung,

4. Ibid.

5. Commander's Evaluation, ATF 13(P), 1 Nov 58

6. Logistic Planning Support, Ops Plan 25-58 Briefing, 1 Nov 58

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located in Northern Taiwan, was the secondary receiving port. Shipments of fuel for the United States Air Force were delivered at Kaceisung by the Military Surface Transportation Service and placed in the Chinese POL system. The Northern system was supplied via small MSTB tankers which transported fuel.

Feng Shan Tank Farm was the main storage terminal for the southern part of Taiwan. The farm had been constructed by the Japanese and contained 100 tanks with a capacity of 1,905 barrels each. The total capacity of that farm was 8,601,000 gallons. Batu was the storage terminal for Northern Taiwan and had a capacity of 1,536,402 gallons.

The southern pipeline supplied Chai Yi and Tainan Air Bases. Its delivery capacity was from 200 to 400 barrels per hour. The entire line was of 6" pipe except for the branch that ran to Ping Tung Air Base from Feng Shan Tank Farm. Tao Yuan and Hsinchu Air Bases were supplied by the northern pipeline which consisted of 6" pipe from Keelung to Tao Yuan and 4" pipe from Tao Yuan to Hsinchu. The delivery capacity was from 100 to 400 barrels per hour. That existing system was adequate to meet only peace time requirements.<sup>7</sup>

7. Ibid.

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Projects for the improvement of the POL system were accomplished through the Military Assistance Program, as well as the Air Task Force Thirteen (P) proposed program. Projects were in progress before the end of November for increasing the pumping capacity of the pipelines and for extending the pipeline from Chai Yi to Hsinchu. The following projects were submitted to USARPAC for approval:

**KIN 5-9, Hsinchu provided for the installation of a standard portable hydrant system in the immediate vicinity of alert and parking areas. Scope of work included preparation of the site, providing earthen dikes for four 1,000 barrel tanks and installing approximately 4,000 lineal feet of 6" pipe line.**

**SIN 4-9, Hsinchu, provided for the installation of one 10,000 barrel steel tank. The scope of work included site preparation, the provision of earthen dikes and tank foundation, approximately 13,400 feet of 6" pipe and necessary valves for connection to existing system. Construction to be in accordance with C-4 and C-5 AFM 86-3, dated 1 March 1955.**

**TAO 2-9, Tao Yuen, provided for the installation of a standard portable hydrant refueling system in the immediate vicinity of the alert area. Scope of work included site preparation, providing earthen dikes for four 1,000 barrel tanks, installing one 600 GPM pump and installing approximately 11,000 lineal feet of 6" pipeline from the storage area.**

**CHI 2-9, Chai Yi, provided for the installation of portable hydrant refueling system in the immediate**

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vicinity of the alert and parking areas. The installation of one 10,000 barrel tank. Scope of work included site preparation, providing earthen dikes for the one 10,000 barrel tank and four 1,000 barrel tanks; installing approximately 5,800 lineal feet of 6" pipeline from the storage tanks.

### AIRLIFT.

When Operations Plan 25-58 was implemented, the United States Air Force base support units were activated at airfields on Taiwan in late August and early September. Because of the time element involved, it became necessary to airlift numerous quantities of materials on an emergency basis. These materials and supplies were not generally considered "air eligible" cargo and would normally move with low priority via surface transportation.

Examples of low grade, low priority cargo moved during late August and early September were: tents, bedding, plywood, lumber, cement, plumbing supplies, brooms, mops and soap. At the same time vast amounts of "air eligible" cargo was airlifted. Double duty tasking resulted in over-flying the original program mission capability of the 50th Troop Carrier Squadron (TCS).

During the first four days of September, the 50th TCS flew a total of 597 hours in deployment, using 17 aircraft. From

8. DF, 13 MDC to 13ODC, Subj: Briefing Material for Presentation to General White, Chief of Staff, USAF, 15 Dec 58, w/3 Incls.

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4 September to 1 December, the squadrons hauled 3, 812 passengers and 2, 738 tons, flying 691 sorties.

In an analysis of the logistic support for the Kimmen Affair, General Kuter explained that one matter to carefully scrutinize was the trans-Pacific airlift. The statistics shows that there was a continuous backlog of air freight at Travis Air Force Base from the outset of hostilities to the end of the crisis, a backlog in excess of the big "normal" 72 hours working backlog. That excess reached 395 tons during the first week of October.

The backlog grew because of several factors: the deployment of forces to the Pacific, the upgrading of PACAF requisitions in accordance with new supply priorities, the expedited logistics delivery of existing material deficiencies to PACAF units, and to the Chinese Air Force.

General Kuter said: "I must say that we did not collapse because of the airlift backlog, but we must remember that we have not fired a shot and that time was certainly working in our favor." He was quite certain that some items moved by air could have been moved by water, but in general cases, however, General Kuter

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questioned the risks taken by certain water shipments.

### MAINTENANCE.

When Operations Plan 25-58 was implemented, maintenance guidance was rendered to the 72d Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-100's and to the 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron with F-86D's at Clark Air Base, to the 41st Fighter Interceptor Squadron with F-86 D's at Guam, and the 868th Tactical Missile Squadron with TM-61C's at Taiwan.<sup>10</sup>

With the deployment of CASF units, the maintenance responsibilities multiplied many-fold. Of all the units rendered maintenance the 868th Tactical Missile Squadron maintained the highest record with an operational ready rate of 98 percent. The remaining two percent was maintenance incurred in covering the Pilot Static Parts of the missile. The coverings were removed prior to count downs.

The 72d Tactical Fighter Squadron was the lowest with an operational readiness rate of 56.5 percent. Extenuating circumstances, however, accounted for this low operational readiness percentage. The 6200th Air Base Wing was in the process of

10. DF, 13MDC to 13ODC, Subj: Briefing Material for Presentation to General White, Chief of Staff, USAF, 15 Dec 58, w/1 Incl, Maintenance Summary.

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conversion to AFM-66-1 concepts when Operations Plan 25-58 was implemented. An engine test stand which was in the process of construction seriously delayed completion of periodic inspections. A flying hour program of 700 hours had some effect on the rise of unscheduled maintenance.

The 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron maintained a 71.2-percent operational readiness rate and encountered no serious maintenance problems. The lack of a test stand had its effect, but did not deter the unit from its EWP posture. Six aircraft of the 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron were deployed and maintained at Taiwan.

An average of 74.7 percent operational ready rate was maintained by the 41st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron. Maintenance problems were minor and were adequately handled at squadron level.

The 25th and 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons deployed to Taiwan were operational in record time, and maintained a high operational ready rate of 83.3 percent.

Supply difficulties were encountered with F-105's by the 188th Tactical Fighter Squadron at the time of deployment on

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Taiwan, but those supply difficulties were soon resolved. The unit was operational almost immediately, and maintained an operational ready rate of 74 percent. Two aircraft were damaged, however, but one aircraft was repaired and flying within ten days.

A 71 percent operational readiness was maintained by the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron with its F-100's. No major problems were prevalent and a well proportioned flying schedule was met.

The 83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployed its F-104's aircraft disassembled at Hamilton Air Force Base and airlifted them to Taiwan. The assembly of twelve aircraft was accomplished quickly and the unit flew missions within four days after arriving at Taiwan. The AOCF rate for that unit was very high and accounted for an operational ready rate of only 71 percent. When supplies were received, however, the 83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron attained an operational ready rate of 83 percent. That rate was maintained until AOCF's again affected the operation. All supply support came from Hamilton Air Force Base, California.

Inspection and maintenance accounted for the low operational

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ready rate of 65.5 percent in the 17th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. With only six RF-101's assigned, each malfunction appeared magnified. One aircraft was AOCF approximately 45 days when a leading edge was damaged in a mid-air collision. The leading edge and attachments were ordered from the ZI and within 12 hours after receipt, the aircraft was operational.

The 522d Tactical Fighter Squadron with F-101's maintained an average 86 percent operational ready rate. Only twice did that unit fall below the required 70 percent operational ready rate.

The highest operational ready rate of 88.8 percent was sustained by the 499th Tactical Bomber Squadron of B-57's. The lowest drop was 78 percent.

The 4505th Aerial Refueling Squadron with KB-50J's averaged an operational ready rate of 85.5 percent. Seven aircraft were maintained at Clark Air Base, the remaining three operated out of Kadana Air Base. Engine changes accounted for the bulk of out-of-commission rate.

While being deployed, the 50th Troop Carrier Squadron with C-130's, maintained an operational ready rate of 78.4 percent. That rather high rate was due partly to the rapidly filled ZI requisitions.

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One other interesting point which contributed materially to operational ready rate was the rapid improvement percentage of completion of flyaway kits.

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The following chart is a brief rundown on logistic activities:

- a. AOCF pipeline time. AOCF pipeline time as determined for the CASF units was:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Days Involved</u>
388th TFS	F-100	7.4
477th TFS	F-100	10.7 *
83d FIS	F-104	22.8
17th TRS	RF-101	22.8
522d TFS	F-101	12.2
16th FIS	F-86D	9.7
25th FIS	F-86D	9.7
499th TBS	B-57	28.0 **
50th TCS	C-130	12.7

\* Only three items requisitioned during period.

\*\* Represents only one item requisitioned during period.

- b. AOCF pipeline time for Thirteenth Air Force organic units:

26th FIS	F-86D	8.5
41st FIS	F-86D	8.5
72d TFS	F-100	5.5

Insofar as operational readiness status was concerned, the aircraft not fully equipped (ANFE) rate for all organizations was

11. Ibid.

12. DF, IAMDC to 13 ODC, Subj. Briefing Material for Presentation to General White, Chief of Staff, USAF, 15 Dec 58 w/3 inclosures.

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less than one percent. There were no problems encountered in that area for any unit.

There was some ANFE items reported, but those were in the minority and did not affect the operational readiness status. In that respect, the following pipeline time for the ANFE is submitted:

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Days Involved</u>
F-86D	31 *
F-100	16
F-102	8
F-104	Negative
B-57	Negative
KB-50	13
C-130	59**

\* Only 4 items requisitioned during period.

\*\* Only 4 items requisitioned during period.

### CONSTRUCTION.

United States Air Force facilities available for the support of deployment on Taiwan at the beginning of the emergency consisted  
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of the following:

Tainan -Construction to house approximately 600 officers and men was about 65 percent complete. These facilities were being built for the 868th TM Squadron.

13. Ltr, Informal, Col F.D. Shoemaker to B/Gen E.S. Chichester, 26 Nov 1958, w/1 Enclosure, subject: Presentation.

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Chai Yi -- Existing Chinese Air Force facilities sufficient to accommodate 136 men were on loan to the USAF and had been previously used by rotational units.

Shu Linkun -- Facilities were available for the Joint Security Services. No significant augmentation was experienced as a result of Operations Plan 25-58.

ATF IMP -- The compound provided adequate space to house only existing staff officers.

The short notice of impending deployment of units to Taiwan precluded use of normal installations procedures. Immediate action was taken to survey facility requirements, locate materials, and secure concurrence of local Chinese Air Force commanders to proposed construction sites. Thirteenth Air Force also had to secure PACAF concurrence on the use of P-450 money for construction purposes. Fortunately, both the Chinese Air Force and PACAF were cooperative.

Chinese and United States Air Force installations personnel worked around the clock to provide facilities to make USAF units operational. Chinese contractors were secured through Chinese Air Force installations engineers, and CAF commanders made sure that prices were low and that work was expedited. As a result of Chinese Air Force cooperation, initial facilities at Tao Yuan were available for occupancy in less than a week after the notification

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of the impending deployment of the F-104's. Construction of facilities at other deployment bases followed a similar pattern.

After the emergency build-up, a more orderly program was established, and the administrative details were straightened out that had previously been neglected. In addition, by mid-November, USAF Installations personnel were in the process of reviewing additional construction projects. The additional proposals included two communications buildings, one at Taipei and one at Tainan, and some additional troop housing at Tainan.

In aluminum buildings on Taiwan, USAF received quite a bargain from the Chinese contractors, when it was revealed that the charge was only \$2.50 per square foot compared with \$5.00 per square foot for the Butler buildings on Clark Air Base.

At the beginning of the emergency there were no adequate Installations Engineer plans available for that type of operation which actually occurred. A package should be prepared with plans and specifications, including detailed plans and specifications for essential construction items such as tent pads, frames, latrines, and small buildings. Installations Engineer teams should be formed before being sent into an advance area, thus enabling these teams to

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function immediately upon arrival. Each major air base in the PACAF area of responsibility should have a team pre-designated for that purpose.

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**TRANSPORTATION.**

Lack of vehicular transportation and support equipment was initially acute, and in some cases remained for quite some time. The number and types of vehicles needed to support Operations Plan 25-58 were not available within Thirteenth Air Force and SAMAP resources, therefore it was necessary to call on Fifth Air Force to supply the remainder. Some of these vehicles, however, were inoperative upon arrival. One good example that showed the situation was the arrival of two F-1A refuelers at Tao Yuan in poor mechanical condition, with contaminated tanks, defective pump seals, defective hoses, and interior tank rust. Commercial contract transportation proved effective between Tao Yuan and Taipei.

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14. Logistic Planning Support, Operations Plan 25-58, Briefing, 1 Nov 58.
15. Operations Plan 25-58 Briefing, 1 Nov 58
16. Ibid.

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## BUDGET AND FISCAL

In the absence of Comptroller guidance in Operations Plan 25-58, a decision was made at Air Task Force Thirteen (P) that any funds available, or considered to be available, could be used without regard to normal legal requirements should the preservation of life or property or other emergency measures brought about by the crisis so demand; and that if funds were not available, that commitments in support of Operations Plan 25-58 would be made without formal action to obtain funds; and that requests and justifications for funds would be submitted when circumstances permitted or when requested by higher headquarters. The concept was outlined and discussed verbally by radphone with the Comptroller, Thirteenth Air Force. The Comptroller concurred in that concept.<sup>1</sup>

On the basis of an Annual Financial Plan submitted to Thirteenth Air Force on 30 June 1958, Air Task Force Thirteen (P) had received an Annual Budget Authorization in the amount of \$1,978,000 in Budget Project 450 - O&M, operational support, designed to finance ATF 13(P)'s normal operations. Under that plan, commitments and obligations for the first half of Fiscal Year

1. Logistic Planning Support, Operations Plan 25-58, Briefing, ATF 13(P), 1 Nov. 58.

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1959 were planned as follows:

	1st Quarter July - Sept. \$	2d Quarter Oct - Dec \$	Total 6 Months \$
Commitments	864,100.00	427,900.00	1,292,000.00
Obligations	<u>829,508.00</u>	<u>450,494.00</u>	<u>1,280,002.00</u>
Total:	1,693,608.00	878,394.00	2,572,002.00

Actual Funding Actions:

P-458 Cumulative	July - Aug \$	September \$	October (Totalive) \$
Commitments	284,125.40	686,430.74	790,399.10
Obligations	<u>326,469.84</u>	<u>644,588.73</u>	<u>1,876,925.70</u>
Total:	610,595.24	1,331,019.47	2,666,924.80

Actions by months 610,595.24      720,393.23      1,335,925.33

These actions, when compared with the normal funding plan, illustrated the accelerated funding that was required to support Operations Plan 25-58, Air Task Force Thirteen (P), anticipated that its annual requirements for Fiscal Year 1959 would be in excess of \$5,000,000.

As of 23 August, no program had been authorized for new construction using P-342 funds. Thirteenth Air Force, however, granted authority to use P-458 funds to support Operations Plan 25-58, with the understanding that appropriate adjustments between the projects would be accomplished at a later date, and during

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October, an allotment of P-3-G funds amounting to \$159, 881 was received. Adjustments against that figure as of 31 October revealed: obligations of \$26, 578. 63 and commitments of \$122, 300. 98 for a total of \$148, 879. 61.

Operations Plan 25-58 contemplated the use of Tainan and Chia Yi Air Bases only. The actual utilization of several other bases, which needed modification and construction to varying degrees was required in order to accommodate the units involved. Since utilization of these bases had not been pre-planned or envisioned, it was necessary to do some "on-the-spot" procurement, and confirmed with proper documentation at a later date, which actually violated AFR 176-16, but that could not be helped.

The Department of the Navy had responsibility for furnishing finance service on Taiwan. For payment to vendors, the Navy disbursing office would accept only fully prepared and supported vouchers that were certified by the Procurement Officer, which required the P&C office to take the vendor's invoices and receiving reports, assemble them with the applicable purchase order or contract, then prepare and certify the voucher. The additional workload overtaxed the P&C office and as a result payments to the

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vendors were unduly delayed, which in turn, strained United States Air Force's relationship with the vendors, upon whom it was almost totally dependent, and adversely reflected upon the United States Air Force and the United States in general.

The Navy's disbursing procedures also did not permit "casual" payments to military personnel who were not in possession of their military pay records (MPR) as did United States Air Force procedures. Units and personnel who were deployed to Taiwan, in many instances, were there under circumstances which precluded them from obtaining either sufficient cash or their MPR's prior to departure. Because the Navy could not pay those individuals by "casual" methods, it imposed undue hardship and personal embarrassment in some cases. To overcome that situation, ATF 13(P)'s Comptroller sought help from Clark Air Base Comptroller, who responded in every instance by dispatching Finance personnel to Taiwan with forms and cash to make the payments. That action gave immeasurable assistance to ATF 13(P)'s Finance Office.

Air Task Force Thirteen (P)'s Comptroller said that from his viewpoint it would appear desirable that in the future each echelon's

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Operations Plan 25-58 be refined to include:

"..... specific facilities requirements for all bases that would be utilized. Completion of facilities actions to be provided for in a 'pre-implementation phase' of the plans. This would eliminate, insofar as possible, the unsupported, emergency obligation of funds for those purposes; would permit such actions to be taken in an orderly and regulatory manner, and would preclude actions which might be in violation of statutory provisions ....."

"..... funding (budget) guidance be incorporated ..... and that it be sufficiently broad and/or flexible to insure that the question of fund availability in no way restricts or hampers performance of the missions prescribed. ...."

"..... an Air Force disbursing (Finance) office should be established on Taiwan, preferably on a permanent basis to insure that Air Force obligations and moral commitments were honored in accordance with Air Force standards. In lieu thereof, a mobile Finance Office should be deployed, either as an integral part of concurrently with -- CASF and other support units. This action could be taken on the assumption that the Navy Disbursing Offices on Taiwan, under normal conditions, were not prepared or manned to assume the additional workloads imposed by Operations Plan 25-58, nor is it feasible for unilateral Air Force plans to impose such an additional requirement upon a non-Air Force activity....."

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EQUIPMENT TO CHINESE AIR FORCE

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**EQUIPMENT TO CHINESE AIR FORCE**

On 28 August 1958 a milestone in the relationship between the United States Air Force and the Chinese Air Force took place, for on that day the United States Air Force announced the assignment of F-100F aircraft to the Chinese Air Force and gave the schedule of delivery of the new planes to enable the organization "to achieve a qualitative superiority over the opposing force."

The announcement said that six of the high performance aircraft had departed Hickam Air Force Base en route to Taiwan on 27 August 1958, operated by instructor pilots who had been familiarized with the new equipment.<sup>1</sup>

The announcement placed upon Thirteenth Air Force the responsibility of assistance to MAAG-Taiwan in developing the training program and providing needed material for it. It stipulated that support equipment for the project would be positioned at Chi Yi.

The services of a mobile training team were needed by the Chinese Air Force pilots of these new aircraft which arrived on 1 September and an 11-man team arrived from the 21 on 16

1. Monograph, "Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958" 11 Dec 58, by A.C. O'Neill.

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September to provide that requirement. The team was the Mobile Training Team 59-14-1, a part of the 3499th Field Training Wing stationed at Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois. The mobile team provided complete F-100F instruction to both Chinese pilots and maintenance technicians, and ten Chinese pilots soloed on 3 October 1958 in the two-seated Supersabres. So rapid was the progress that the training unit readied a full complement of trained personnel for the Chinese Air Force by 1 December. The F-100F training program was inaugurated under auspices of the Air Force Section of MAAG-Taiwan.<sup>2</sup>

#### TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT.

On 30 September it was learned that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had approved delivery of F-56F aircraft to the Republic of Korea Air Force. The Chinese Air Force, however, had an immediate requirement for this <sup>at</sup> type of aircraft, and it was therefore decided that the first 35 aircraft out of the inspection and repairs as necessary facility at Tainan, originally scheduled for Republic of Korea Air Force, would be transferred to the Chinese Air Force. The first 24 aircraft out of deprocessing in

2. B14

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**Japan would also be transferred to the Chinese Air Force. One F-86F undergoing modification for Sidewinder capability would be transferred to the Allied Air Force.**

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


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.PHOTOGRAPHS  
HQ, THIRTEENTH AIR TASK FORCE (P)

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
Front View of Air Task Force Thirteen (Provisional) Headquarters.

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Brigadier General Fred M. Dean, Commander, Air Task Force Thirteen Provisional (left) with Brigadier General Adelin P. Tacon, Commander, Twelfth Air Force.

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Personal Services Office, Air Task Force Thirteen Provisional.

(Left to Right): Cap. T.N. Baylie, A/1C W. Lyon, Colonel F.B. Makentash, and A/2C H. Wong.


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Office of Procurement and Supply. (Two Views)



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
Communications and Electronics



Chapel of Air Task Force Thirteen Provisional


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Library of Air Task Force Thirteen (Prov)

Jane Hua (left)  
A/2C D.F. Yeoman (right)



Administrative Building, Air Task Force  
Thirteen, Provisional.

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
Air Task Force Thirteen Provisional  
Officers' Club



Air Task Force Thirteen Provisional  
Airmen's and Non-Commissioned Officers' Club

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Gym and Pool Room of Air Task Force Thirteen.

(Left to Right): Gym Instructor, G. Wang; Student,  
A/3C M. Larkins; (Background, Left to Right):  
A/1C O. Calton, A/2C M.A. Villareal.



Basketball Court.

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Interior View of the Officers' Club at Air Task Force Thirteen Provisional.



Swimming Pool Situated Back of Officers' Club

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TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN  
OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN TAIWAN

Control Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan  
-Oct. 27, 1958

Dear Sirs:

On behalf of the parliamentary Control Yuan of the Republic of China, we, the representatives of the Yuan, wish to welcome you most cordially, and extend to you our sincere appreciation and admiration of your determined efforts against Communist aggression.

We strongly support the "Non-appeasement" policy which your country has taken toward the Chinese Communists. Just as President Dwight D. Eisenhower has said, "The sniping which the Chinese Communists started on August 23 has as its purpose not just taking of the island of Quemoy," but "as a part of what is an ambitious plan of armed conquest." Both the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia have more than once revealed their ambition of conquering Taiwan and driving you off the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific.

Your coming to assist us in defense of Taiwan according to the Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty has twice forced the aggressors into ceasing fire. If the Communists dare to intensify hostilities, it is firmly believed that they will be punished severely by the anti-aggression forces of our two nations, and that the people on the China mainland will also rise to overthrow the despotic regime and welcome our troops of righteousness.

Victory in our united struggle against Communism and Soviet imperialism!

Long live the friendship between the Republic of China and the United States!

Yours truly,

W. H. King	C. L. Chu
A. C. Chang	Y. H. Kang
Y. H. Chien	C. M. Chen
K. C. Liu	P. C. Tso
S. L. Chang	Y. L. Ho

(Signed)

書勞慰士將軍美致院察監

駐台美國武裝部隊的官兵們：

我們代表中華民國最高民意機關——監察院，特向你們表示我們由衷的歡迎，並對你們反侵略的決心和辛勞表示誠摯的讚揚和感激。

我們熱烈地支持 貴國對中共匪幫的「不姑息」政策。誠如艾森豪總統所說：「中共在八月二十三日發動的射擊，其目的不僅在取得金門」而「是它武力征服計劃的野心的一部份」。中共和俄共也不止一次地自承大想征服台灣並把你們逐出台灣海峽和西太平洋。

你們根據中美共同防禦協定來台協防，已使侵略者有所畏懼而不得不兩次停火。如果它敢擴大戰事，中美兩國的反侵略部隊一定會給它嚴厲的制裁，而大陸人民也必揭竿而起，推翻暴政，以迎接我們的正義之師。

反共抗俄勝利萬歲！  
中美友誼萬歲！

中華民國四十七年十月二十七日

監察院  
院長 王雲五  
副院長 王雲五

監察院  
秘書長 王雲五  
副秘書長 王雲五

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