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FORMOSA:

Formosa is one of the most formidable island bastions of the Japanese inner defence line and an important link in the vital chain of Empire communications. It is strategically located astride the sea lanes and airways connecting Japan and its southern empire. It dominates the approaches to China and protects the southern flank of the Japanese homeland. It is a major obstacle along the road to victory in the Orient. Its importance increased with every mile that the armed forces of the U.S. drive towards Japan.

As a target for aerial attack, Formosa had three main attractions for the newly organized 14th Air Force. First, the island was studded with targets of immense strategic and tactical importance. Second, these targets were highly concentrated in small areas making them particularly vulnerable to air attack. Third, the 14th was building the only air bases from which an attack on Formosa could be made during 1943.

The principal Formosan targets were airfields and aircraft factories; ports with concentrations of shipping, storage areas and docks, and the metallurgical industries. Formosa is one of the largest air centers for both army and navy air forces. It contains 47 airfields including three seaplane bases and facilities for all types of aircraft work including modification and vehicle assembly. Airfields were used principally as training and staging centers and always contained heavy concentrations of planes. The southwestern parts of Formosa were the most important convoy assembly point in the Japanese Empire. Shipping concentrations in harbours and roadsteads constantly outweighed the tonnage in any other series of Japanese ports. The dock areas were surrounded by tremen-

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dous storage areas containing everything from poison gas, ammunition and fuel to food and clothes. Major aluminium and alumina plants were located on the island and approximately 15% of the Empire's supply of Copper came from this small island.

The vulnerability of the aircraft concentrations on the island was demonstrated by the 14th's attack on Shinchiku Airdrome in Northern Formosa on November 25, 1943. In many respects the Shinchiku raid was a perfect mission. It was the result of long, patient and careful planning; absolute security and perfect timing and execution. Major damage was inflicted on the enemy without loss to the 14th.

The story of Shinchiku begins on April 1, 1943, when Lt. John W. Robinson, of the 21st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron took the first aerial pictures of Northern Formosa. Taking off from Kweilin, Lt. Robinson refueled at the emergency strip at Suichwan and headed across the Formosa Straits. He photographed Taihoku, Shinchiku, Tansui and Toien and returned to Kweilin. His pictures of Shinchiku Airdrome caused a sensation in 14th Air Force Headquarters. They showed 50 twin-engined bombers crowded on the concrete apron along the hangar line. Bombers were parked in neat rows wing-tip to wing-tip - a perfect target for air attack. It was the most tempting target General Chennault had seen since the winter of 1941 when the AVG photographed Japanese planes covering the fields at Bangkok in preparation for the aerial attack on Burma.

On April 26, Colonel Bruce Holloway flew a visual reconnaissance over Northern Formosa and confirmed the presence of the target at Shinchiku. Near the Airdrome he spotted a flight of nine twin-engined bombers heading westward to sea. Colonel Holloway followed them across the Formosa Straits concealing his P-40 behind

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stray clouds. Just off Foochow he noted a straggler from the bomber formation and promptly shot it down.

The target at Shinchiku interested many of the tactical personnel in the 14th. Lt. Colonel John Alison begged for the chance to lead a raid on Shinchiku, but General Chennault refused to allow the mission. In the Spring of 1943, there was little the 14th could do about Shinchiku. It lacked three requisites for attacking Formosa - sufficient bombers to make a hard strike; long range fighters for escorting over the Jap stronghold, and a base close enough to Formosa to serve as a springboard for the attack. Photo-interpreters and intelligence personnel made a careful, detailed study of the Shinchiku Airdrome. Sgts. Arnegard and Naves prepared a detailed overlay of the target and surrounding terrain. Among the Headquarters personnel who studied the Shinchiku pictures was Colonel Clinton D. Vincent, then Chief of Staff. He studied them carefully and he never forgot them.

When the Forward Echelon of the 14th moved to Kweilin in May of 1943, Colonel Vincent set his heart on hitting Shinchiku. He tried to get fresh photo cover but Formosa lay blanketed in a heavy cloud all summer. On July 17, Lt. Lester Paglusio of the 21st managed to find a break in the overcast over Formosa but all he was able to photograph were the Tainan salt flats. Shinchiku remained hidden from the camera lens.

In September, Colonel Vincent left China for temporary duty in the United States. When he returned to Kweilin on November 1, 1943, his first thought was of Shinchiku. While he was away the pattern for the Shinchiku raid was slowly forming. A squadron of P-38's arrived in China during August. The P-38 had the range, speed and firepower to do double duty as a long range escorting fighter

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and a low level strafers. By the end of September, the field at Suichwan was ready for use and in early October a fighter detachment of the 76th Squadron moved out to defend it. Suichwan put both P-38s and B-25s within easy range of Shinchiku. Late in October, 16 P-51As reached China. They were old and worn from rough usage in an operational training unit, but they too had the range to escort B-25s to Formosa. Eight were finally put into shape for a mission. Early in November the 1st Bomb Squadron of the Chinese American Wing reached Kweilin with their Mitchells.

The picture was complete. Colonel Vincent then had enough B-25s to strike hard; long-range, hard-hitting fighter escorters and a base from which to launch his attacks. All he needed was fresh photo cover of the target.

On November 3 and 4, Lt. Weston E. Tenney of the 21st made two flights over Northern Formosa and brought back excellent pictures of Shinchiku. On November 3 the photos showed 58 planes on the field including 50 twin-engined bombers. The next day there were 79 planes.

Photo interpreter, Captain Charles Barber went to work on the pictures. He drained them dry of information and extracted every detail from the field and surrounding terrain. The field lay exactly one mile inland from the sandy shores of the Formosa Straits. It was marked by an octagonal drainage ditch around its perimeter. The runways formed an equilateral triangle pointing northeast with sides 4,000 feet long and a hypotenuse of 5,000 feet.

There was a row of large hangars along the southwest edge of the field. In front of these hangars lay a concrete apron - 2,000 feet long and 5,000 feet wide, on which most of the bombers were parked. On the western edge of the field work was in progress on a

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large dispersal area along the coast where revetments had been scooped out of the sand dunes. It was obvious that the Japanese were aware of the advantages of dispersal, but a trifle tardy in taking the necessary action.

Beyond the hangars were extensive aircraft repair and modification shops. To the east of the shops there was a large barracks area. Light flak positions flanked the runways. Later intelligence confirmed the fact that Shinchiku was a modification center and advance training field for the Japanese navy airforce.

Captain Barber determined the heights of the coastal sand dunes, dimensions of the hangars and located check points along the coast around the field. His interpretation of Lt. Tenney's photographs provided all of the detailed information necessary to plan the attack.

Colonel Vincent ordered another photo mission to get final briefing pictures, but the weather closed in again and the missions were unsuccessful. On November 23, the weather broke and Lt. Winifred A. Sordelett was able to photograph Shinchiku. At the evening staff meeting of the Forward Echelon on November 23, Colonel Vincent exhibited Lt. Sordelett's pictures.

"There are a lot of bombers on Shinchiku," he announced, turning to Colonel David L. Hill, "any suggestions Tex?"

"Let's get 'em," replied Colonel Hill.

Colonel Vincent designated Colonel Hill as commander of a special striking force to execute the raid. This airforce consisted of eight P-51A's; 14 B-25's and eight P-38's.

The mission was planned as a low level daylight attack. It was a daring gamble for high stakes, the principal factor was surprise. If the enemy was surprised the American airmen stood an excellent

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chance of accomplishing their mission with a minimum of casualties. If the enemy had sufficient warning to call up fighters from the fields within interception radius of Shinchiku, disaster would be more than likely.

High ceilings were forecast for Formosa for the 24, 25 and 26 of November. Photo cover on the 22nd showed that the dispersal area at Shinchiku was nearly finished and ready for use. Another photo-reconnaissance was ordered for the 24th and flight leaders were briefed for the mission. Col. Hill was to lead the P-51A's of the 76th Fighter Squadron. The Lightnings of the 449th Fighter Squadron were commanded by Capt. Sam Palmer, former squadron commander and Forward Echelon operations officer at the time of the raid. A flight of eight B-29s from the 11th Bomb Squadron was under the command of Lieut. Col. Joseph B. Wells followed by six from the 1st Bomb Squadron of the Chinese-American Wing led by Lieut. Col. Irving Branch.

Individual flights left their fields on the afternoon of Nov. 25 and converged on Suichwan before dark. The P-51A's came from Lombard Field; the 11th bombers from Yang Tong and the Chinese-American planes from Erh Tong. The 449th came from Lingling. Only one P-51A failed to arrive at Suichwan. By dark the new field contained one of the largest and most powerful striking forces ever assembled by the 14th.

Captain Winifred Bordelett returned to Suichwan in the late afternoon with fresh pictures of Shinchiku. They showed 75 bombers and six single-engine planes on the field. These pictures were used for the final briefing the next morning.

The night passed quietly. Briefing began at 7 a.m. and lasted for two hours. Every phase of the attack was gone over in

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minute detail. Check points for the all important landfall - the mouth of the Hozan river and two taxi strips leading to the beach - were carefully detailed, and alternate check points planned in case of navigation errors. The lead B-25 with lieut. Raymond J. Mazanowski was to navigate for the entire formation to and from the target. Fighters were to follow on the flanks of the bomber formation until landfall on the coast of Fornosa.

To avoid detection by enemy radar the formation was briefed to cross the Fornosa Straits just above the wave tops. On sighting the Fornosan coast the attack formation was to be formed. The P-38's were to pull ahead and lead the way into the target. Their assignment was to knock out enemy air opposition. The P-25's were to pull up to 1,000 feet - the minimum altitude for safely dropping frag clusters - and dump their bombs in the concentration of planes along the apron; the hangars and shops. The P-51A's were to come in behind the bombers to protect their tails and strafe parked planes and ground installations. The entire formation was briefed to make one pass at the target and get out. Each fighter pilot was assigned a specific area of the airdrome to cover with his guns. The idea was to get one enemy plane apiece and then get out.

While the crews were being briefed the mission passed through one of its most critical phases. The Japs had been alerting Suichwan regularly and bombing frequently. If there had been any kind of an alert between dawn and take-off time the planes would have had to scramble for safety and the raid would have been cancelled. There was no alert and the crews and pilots trotted directly from the briefing shack to their planes.

Take-off was at 09.35. After circling for altitude the

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formation disappeared over the mountains to the east. All over eastern China ground crews settled back to sweat out the mission. Only a few staff officers in Kweilin knew where the mission was going but everybody sensed that it was something big. At each home base the men clustered around the operational radios and sweated out the plots as the formation moved east. The Chinese net followed the formation to the coast at Foochow and then there was silence. "Thirty planes going east" was the last report from the coast. Silence and tensions enveloped the fields. Noon came but few felt like eating. Knots of sweaty mechanics hung around operations shacks and radio stations waiting for word - sweating out their planes and pilots.

The pre-arranged radio code for the flash to Colonel Vincent on the results of the raid was "Boston" for no good; "New York" for cancelled due to weather, and "San Antonio" (Colonel Vincent's hometown) for good results. The staff in Colonel Vincent's Headquarters at Kweilin expected to receive the flash by 1.30 p.m. The hands on their wrist watches swept past 1.30 and no word. Then they began to sweat in earnest. Work virtually ceased as everybody stared off into space and waited. Two o'clock passed with only silence from the radio. Imaginations began to twitch - 2.30 p.m. and nothing. The tension was terrific - 3.45, silence. The Headquarters building seemed even more oppressive and stuffy than usual - 3.55, the radio crackled, "San Antonio in a big way." Colonel Vincent grinned with relief and the Headquarters relaxed.

Here is what happened. The formation hit the China coast 20 miles south of Foochow and went down to the deck for the crucial flight across the Straits. Stratus clouds made a gray ceiling at

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12,000 feet and a strong north wind whipped through the Straits kicking up white caps off the gray waves. B-25's of the 11th Bomb Squadron lead the formation. On the right of the bombers were the P-51's; on the left, P-38's. From Foochow to the Formosan coast, the success of the mission hung heavily on the square, stout shoulders of Lieut. Raymond Mazanowski, lead navigator of the bombers flying in Lieut. Col. Wells' plane. If Mazanowski missed his landfall on the Formosan coast, there was little chance of a surprise and Japanese interception could easily wash out the mission. A stiff north wind and gray monotony of the sea only added to the difficulties of his job.

Mazanowski made his landfall exactly. It was planned to hit the target at noon. Precisely at noon the formation spotted the white surf breaking against the shore. They could see the tanned sandy mouth of the Hozan river to the north and light streaks of two taxi strips cutting across the darker countryside to the sand dune revetments along the shore. Crammed in the cockpit of his P-51A, Col. Hill checked his watch, clipped on his gun switch and thought of his wife and family sitting down to a sumptuous Thanksgiving dinner in Texas.

The P-38's opened their throttles and buzzed in on the target. The B-25's pulled up into their climb to 1,000 feet and the P-51A's swished across the coast in a wide S turn that allowed the bombers time to climb and level off before the Mustangs swept in behind them.

The first flight of Lightnings led by Captain Sam Palmer hit the field at 12.05. Above the airdrome a dozen Jap bombers, transports and fighters were circling lazily in a landing pattern.

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Palmer eased his flight into the traffic pattern. Suddenly the air was full of fire, smoke and shattered planes. Bombers tumbled out of the pattern trailing plumes of thick, black smoke and hot orange flame. The Japs had little or no warning. Mechanics and ground crew men were caught working on parked planes. A few fighter pilots scrambled to their planes and took off crosswind.

Captain Palmer pulled up between a twin-engined bomber, gave it a squirt from his 50's and 20 mm cannon and flew through the debris as the bomber exploded. He pulled on to another bomber's tail. Another squirt - another bomber down in flames. Palmer banked to the left line up of a single-engined fighter and caught the Jap with his third burst. In less time than it takes to tell about it, Palmer had knocked three Japs out of the air. The rest of his flight were picking off the remaining planes in a pattern, while the second flight picked off the strays trying to escape and strafed parked bombers on the ground. Captain Ryan Moon, leading the second flight, shot down two bombers in the air, and accounted for two more parked on the concrete apron. Lieut. Robert Schultz picked off a tri-motored transport trying to land and then shot down a Val bomber at 500 feet. Lieut. Rose shattered another bomber in the pattern and knocked down an Oscar coming up off the field. Lieut. Yourston caught two bombers in the air. Lieut. Davis fired a transport and three bombers on the ground. Lieut. Col. MacMillan touched off a pair of bombers on the ground and Lieut. Opsvig destroyed a parked fighter and two bombers. Lieut. Rose, flying his first combat mission, came back for another pass and got nothing but holes in his plane.

The B-25's followed the P-38's across the field. Streamers of smoke were driving across the field from burning bombers and crashed planes. At least a dozen planes on the big apron were in flames. Some

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ground crew men were still running across the field for cover. Others stopped in their tracks and fired at the bombers with sub-machine guns and rifles. Machine gun fire came up from the gun pits along the beach and around the eastern edges of the field. Three fighters were taking off.

Eight Mitchells of the 11th were the first bombers over the target, followed by the Chinese-American planes. Bombs were dropping among the bombers on the apron. The frag clusters drilled on through the hangars and shops - 168 clusters containing a total of more than 2,000 individual frag bombs ripped through the planes, men and buildings. Three Mitchells of the 11th turned off to the east and strafed the barracks. One Oscar came in on the strafers in a head on pass. Cpl. Frank Norton, engineer gunner in the top turret of Captain Loren Nichol's plane, put a burst into the fighter's engine. Two other gunners and a bombardier saw the fighter fall over and crash into the Hozan River.

A mile behind the Mitchells came Lieut. Col. Hill and his clean-up squad of Mustangs. Mustang pilots could see explosions over the field as the P-38's went into the landing pattern. By the time they hit the field most of the damage had been done. Col. Hill led the first flight in behind the Mitchells. A pair of Oscars were climbing off the field to attack the bombers. Col. Hill got the first olive drab Oscar Mark Z as it chandelled to get on the tail of the last Mitchell. It crashed from 200 feet and burned. Lieut. Bell hit the second, a coal black Zeke, as it turned in on the bombers. Col. Hill blew up a twin-tailed Nell parked near the middle of the field. Another fighter made a head on pass at Captain Williams leading the second flight of Mustangs. Williams ignored the attack and

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continued strafing. His wing man, Lieut. Olney, fired at the fighter as he tried to flip under Capt. Williams' tail.

Captain Williams burned up a Sally on the ground and Lieut. Hedrick exploded another close by Williams' victim. Captain Stewart and Lieut. Colbert swung on down the southwestern side of the field and picked off a pair of Sallys parked on a small apron by the side of the hangars. Pulling away from the field, Lieut. Colbert failed to notice a tree and clipped part of his wing on the branch. By 12.10 the last Mustang was clear of the target.

At 12.20, Lieut. Tenney flew over the field in a F-5 at 27,000 feet and took pictures of the smoking shambles. In less than 10 minutes the American planes had destroyed 42 Jap aircraft - 15 shot down in the air and 27 riddled and burnt on the ground. Six more bombers were probably destroyed on the ground and six others damaged. A total of 54 out of the 79 planes on the field were blasted without damage to the American formation.

The formation climbed to 3,000 feet over the Straits and headed for home. Over the coast they pulled up to 10,000 feet to clear the mountains. There was a broken overcast below them and heavy haze. In the atmosphere of relief and relaxation that followed the successful attack, navigation suffered. The formation passed south of Suichwan and the P-38's began to run low on gas.

One P-38 pilot called on the radio:

"Find me a field or I am getting out of this can - no more gas."

Col. Hill looked through the haze and spotted the field at Kanchow below. The pilot landed safely there.

Meanwhile, Col. Hill was sweating out the radio flash to

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Headquarters. There was a distinct possibility that most of the planes might have to make a crash landing. There was no codeword to cover such an eventuality so he refrained from flashing word to Headquarters until all his planes were safely down at Suichwan.

The only damage suffered by the American planes was a broken propellor and smashed wing tip when a P-51 ground looped while landing at Suichwan; two bullet holes in the hydraulic lines of one Mitchell, and an explosive bullet hole in the nose of another Mitchell.

The mess at Suichwan broke out scores of canned turkey and cranberry sauce. Airmen and ground crews sat down to a belated Thanksgiving Day dinner as darkness covered the field.

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8P-38's of the 449th on 25 November 1943.

Pilots.

Lt. Col. McMillan (George Bray McMillan, Winter Garden, Florida.)

Capt. Ryan M. Moon, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Capt. Samuel L. Palmer, Fort Worth, Texas.

Lt. Kendal B. Dowis, Detroit, Michigan.

Lt. Robert E. Shultz, Sandusky, Ohio.

Lt. John T. Opsvig, Minot, North Dakota.

Lt. Alfred Yorston Jr., Waco, Texas.

Lt. Walter S. Rose, Etowah, Tenn.
Etowah

7 P-51's. of the 76th on 25 November 1943.

Pilots.

Col. David L. Hill, Victoria, Texas

Captain James M. Williams, Huntsville, Texas

Capt. John S. Stewart, Worland, Wyoming.

Lt. ~~James~~ Donald W. Hedrick, Willapa, Washington.

Lt. Olney

Lt. Dale E. Bell, San Luis, Obispo, California.

Lt. Robert T. Colbert, Madison, Wisconsin.

Formosa

planes to Suichuan to stage - needles sweated out plots
disappears at Foochow - 28 ships back to Foochow

2 bullet holes in one B-25 hydraulic line

1-P-51 reached up landing wheel out prop wing tip
landing gear

Robinson's April 1
Schmidt
Tachet 1st photo
Tanner
Toren

Pagden July 17
Tanner Salt Flats

FormosaFormosa - Shishikun

8:40 take-off. 9:35 - down. 15:45


back type back - I carried turkey for dinner
photos were yellow near west when came in afternoon

510 fresh at Kueilin

2 repair truck for Hanchow. ^{then} 1 Hongkong. Ford 10 wheel
engine chg. coolant leaking - no instruction manuals.
make our hydraulic line design
north later got manuals & took rep.

Sgts. Amegans & Neves Overlay from photos Feb. 21 & April 27-47

2 miles from Streets to N edge of apron.

fish position with runway. another near apron
big concrete apron. 500 x 2,000 ft. where planes
parked. row of hangars & shops - working on dispersed
area.Nov. 22 pix 4 to planes.
81 large. 56 on apron. E side of field
1 small.14-B-250 12:15 over target
8-P-38
8-P-51

14-B-250	landing pattern	6 Sailors in air	1 Val
8-P-38	stray planes	3 P-51 in air	2. two other hangars
		11 planes in air	8 Nells on road.
B-250 hit	prop in park area & hangars	3 shrapnel barrels.	
P-51 strafed & knocked off fighters	- got 2 fighters in air	- 6 barrels on ground.	

First photo - Feb 27 - 9th photo now.
 17-14" 59 twin engine - 2 5/8
 Morgan C. corner.

3rd phase P.D. #39 Dec 9. 43

9 tanks 14 stops, 10 barrels each. fuel & ammo.
 maintenance, repair & final assembly all types A/C.
 repair depot & air plant under cover.
 main train & storage, fuel.

A/D 1 mile E of 3rd

Morgan area 1/2 mile N of field.

work.

Nov. 3. 59 - 30 large

4. 79 - 60

4. 81 - 75.

Nov. 22 98 - 81 large
 designed area almost
 ready for use.

Dec 7 cover - 7 more AA pits.

slit trenches

just heap of slag glass. 5 Apr. 200' x 80'

49. large - 6 sand. may tank at work on A/D.

octagonal shape of drainage ditches.

Nov. V4C - M 11/3 - 2 IPS - C

T V 45 - M 11/3 4 Nov. 43 1130

Eastern BasesJuly 23

Nengyay

2 waves.

20B - 25F - 7:20

14B - 8:40.

hit many with 12 did hit abit shot.

42 37

15 13

7 43

Shinshu~~144~~ Oct 15. 44

Tex is charge of strike force.

23rd staff meet evening

Tex bore air suggest?

lets get em.

brief in morning at Suichuan Nov. 25 7 a.m.
brief to take-off.Palmer - ex C.O. ^{444th} red-bushes

phoned to hit at noon hit 12:05.

B- 25 a load.

B10 on reshit

340 on left.

to I.P.

340 pull up & go in.

B10 5 turn & cleanup.

1. Rose 1st mission - 2nd pass
get shot up.

Clinton 3,000 & landed home

to 10,000

8 of Suichuan to Kanchuan.

340 low on gas.

foggy weather.

Up sent message on radio sweeten out.

field as long stripe 2 times

briefed to get one - each man had his area.

Formosa

12:08 - 1,000 ft. 164 frag cluster - 1,000 bombs.
 got accurate info. 4-6 0 seen in air.
 Capt. Frank W. Oster #79 shot one conf. in back on pass.
 went into mine N of A/D.
 egg shell blue & wooden & cut bomb.
 transports in traffic pattern & 3 fighters taking off.
 men running in harbor area.

8-11th - 6 little Nickels, Seale, LaVelle. M. more.
 6-CAU - Lt. Col. I. L. Branch Jr. & family.

Reg. J. M. Aganowski lead navigator

↓ Hager, Connor, Churchill & Seawart
 with Marine crews.

File Formosa

Sat

Takar

Kweli off 4 p.m.

- 8 g. Fisher alums
3. Capt Carey mine.

1 bomb S. water
1 box Takar R/O

80 x 250 ins.
16 x 250 2 hi delg.
15 mins. M-13. map.

4 - Kweli 3 chrysis & 1 mine.
16,000 ft Takar
mine 300 ft.

Est 40% in target - mine never ignited from explosion.

6:30 a.m. bales out 20 mi E Kweli.

Feb. 13. 2 B-29 off K. 5 p.m.

7 mins. in harbor mouth.

Mar. 4. 1 plane laid & other salvaged after 2 other
ground bays & fights.

Pic Schindler

3rd plane Target

Takar harbor & sunk ship

Schindler map routes

East Boxes

42 planes destroyed. later

Destroyed in air

6 bombers

7 fighters

1 strike down bomber

1 transport

Destroyed on ground

25 bombers

1 fighter

1 transport

at least 6 bombers prob. shot
on ground + 6 bombers down
on ground

19th P.F. + A-2 official

file Farnose

Farnose cont.

Jan 11. mine laying Takas.

11 planes led by Col. Fisher off Kure.

5 - Fish alum plant

3 - Capt Carey mines in opp to harbor.

1 bomb Swatow

1 Takas A/D.

1 alum plant 40% hit in target

Target cloud covered.

mine laying after bombers. reported fire.

miss laid 2100 non rest by photo 300 ft. sinker

1 new boiler out w/pt in snow & cold. near Tali P. of Kure.

Feb 11. mine laying see F.I. report.

2 laid total July 13 feet released. 5 in month of July.

Mar. 4. Takas. 2 planes 1 laid 5 across harbor mouth.

another salvaged. bad weather ground logs & lights.

H April 26. Holloway in P-40
Kure to Kure

Takas 13 T/E & DC-3 landing

Schmidt 9 bombers to sea late 1 bomb town

Foskrow - shot down.

got fire

Nov. 4 & 5. Capt Tenny & F/O Will Kure, Takas Shink

Nov. 7. Tenny Taira Takas

Nov. 22 Sandlett & Nov 24.

July 7. Paglensis 1 at Kure Takas.

Tenny after raid.

P-38s. 12 in air 13 on ground. Schmidt

Mon. 2 B in air 2 B gr.

Palm. 3 F in air.

Schly 1 B & 1 T in air

Downs 1 B in 3 B gr.

Yonson 2 B in

Rose 1 Chetwin 1 all in down

Lewis 1 B in 3 B gr.

MacM. 1 B gr.

Opans. 1 P gr. 3 B gr.

11 Bomb. Sketches.

12:08. one target P-51. 12:15.

release in turn 150ft intervals

4-6. Oscars attached bombers shot down by P-38 at 3100.
Capt. Frank Norton #7 got Oscar making head on pass
near river N of A/D.

upstream still in bank woods.

Raymond J. Maganowski lead navigator

vet pilots.

Grizzle, Michel, Mills, Le Valle.

Monroe. Beale. Wells

8 from 11th

6 from CACU. Harper, Carson, Churchill
Slater. Darr. Brant
Chase crew.

Wilton E. Tenney. - 27,000 at 12:20.

Lester C. Paglines

Winifred A. Sardelott. Toyen. Shuler.

24. Shuler.

1 file clerk - ??
 1 research clerk - 3 mos. 1/2
 1 stenographer - 1 yr
 1 typist - 1 yr
 1 photo - editor - 1 yr

Emerson
Mac 4 Clerk }

(E)

5-10-68

Takas raids.

Bessie

Jan 11
Feb 11
Mar 4

April 1 - Robinson Formosa

Bondleth.

Mass-S.-S.

Nov. 26 - King Formosa.

Mar. 10 2. 9.

29 Wells - worked + killed

Dec 7. - Bondleth.

22 11. Mass.

Jan 13 Mass.
17 Permit Capt.

12 Bondleth.

24 Permit

Feb 11 Mass.

13 Mass.

20 Bondleth

14 covers.

6

20 covers.

Formosa Cover

check mission reports +
get target covers.
less complete map

See back June 4

See ship bomb tests Kewlin

cher wanted Wacs but still need

{	Frank Farnsworth	
	See Glenn	
	Go to school	

~~XXI~~ 22 + 4

Reed 18

Hays 14 + 3

Hollom 13 + 5

Cooper 9 + 6

Scott 13 + 5

Herbst 10

for Forward

Takao

Sept 7 1944 - PR - Aug. 31 raid

4 warships lost on main wharves.
lots in dock area little damage.

Photo com.

6 notes on Ape Hill

6. 4,000 ft N of A line in place in Sleds.

Sept 12. 107,000 tons.

400 RR cars.

Aug 29. 106,200 tons.

April 7 - 44. photos of convoy with carrier. 4 MC 23 21 P.R.

Jan 12 44 - 97,100 tons.

500 RR cars.

no food damage for Jan 11 raid

Jan 10 1944 - 13/20 - 13/40 ~~0~~. Jan 12 - sunken ship

Aug. 25 1944 - 4 MB 136 photo of harbor & shipping

Dec 22. TV 16 - M 12/31 - B. sunken ship

Aug 29 - 4 MN 143 Convoy off Takao. 45,000 tons

Jan - June 1944 - 4 coverage 3rd phase. U.S. Navy Ship Center.

increased use as major port. for convoys - port could handle all.

Low. 71,933 gross tons Feb 11. March 6 182,664

lots shipped this in outer harbor.

destroyers & torpedo boats.

Tankers Transports (landed barges died loads)

Aug 26 - on station towards 2 if fog camouflage. air tanks were.
new strips for fighter

Air patrol. Takao A/D & strips

Hogon A/D.

Keto A/D. & satellite

Okazawa A/D.

Kato A/D.

Uson A/D.

15 mile radius

Skinschkin

9:35 46-117 - Wells.
 6 - CACU - Brand.
 8 - P-38 - Palma.
 7 - P-51 - Hill

Section to 20 mi S of Foulke - on deck.

12:15 Cargo

P-38 caught 9 B/A in next landing pattern.
 1st flight got in pattern
 2nd flight took strays.
 B only. 12 pps clustering at peak apex, Hays & show
 & sloped barracade.
 P-51s stricken & shot down fighters.

Surv.

P-38 - 14 Sallys & Wells - 8 on grd. 6 in air.
 3 nets in air
 2 transports in air
 1. Val in air.
 2 Oscars. 1 air & 1 grd.

B-25 group 1 Oscar in air.

P-510 - 1 tech. 1 bomb grd.
 2 down

Hill 1 Oscar in air
 1 bomb grd.
 1 prob.

4 mos. 1 bomb grd.
 1 down.

Stewart 1 bomb grd.

Walker 1 " "

P-38s.

Mc. 2 B grd.

✓ Moor. 3 B. 1 in air.
 2 B. 1 in air.

✓ Palma - 3 B in air.
 1 Oscar in air

✓ Opain 2 B 1 Oscar grd.

✓ Dove 1 transport air 3 B grd.

✓ Schult 1 T in air. 1 Val air.

✓ Rom 1 Oscar 1 B. air.

✓ Yoneto 2 B. air.

M & fire pro on beach & S/E E. NE
 of fields.

N. P. A.

Tokyo - recon. ship inspection.
 mission Jan 11 - mine & alarm plant
 Feb 11 } mine
 Mar. 4 }

Mar 10-44

P.R. H.P.I. depts on formosa
 cover by end of 43

Other Targets

Mako Pescadores - May 43

Koshu A/D Dec. 43.

● Tokyo seaplane base Dec. 43

Takao. March 44.

Tainan Mar. 44

Okoyama Jan 44


Shikish Feb. 44

Pescadores Jan 44

Shikish city

Weibo Feb 26.

no photos & few visitors
 unlooked - no good agents.



It is in line with eng. like U.S. moves close to Japan.

P-I dope

- ① Stages all A/C Engines to S.
Training Base
- ② Put up Takao convey assembly point
more than all ports N of Shanghai
average 150,000 Takao.
- ③ Takao aluminum & alumina.
Electro " plant

hydro-electric

Okoyama & Nito - army fields. (assembly factories)

(navy)
61st naval air arsenal
Shinkibiki (replane shop)
+ ship
Taka - big seaplane base
repair & modify

Matsuyama - Taihoku

Tainan

47 air fields (military seaplane bases)
Tremendous military service Sanyan

Copper works - 15% - Kinkasiki
ferro-magnesium - (Kanyasee)
bdg. oil refineries at fields in N.

Taka depot + P.O.E. - gas, ammo, food, barracks. fuel
underground

17) imp targets
concentrated
range of 14th division base

Formosa - Shinchiku radi November 25, 1943

interview with Lieut. Col. Wilfred J. Smith, A-2 of forward echelon at time of mission, briefing officer for raid.

Holloway got first photo cover of Formosa in April 43 - pix of Shinchiku showed dozens of Jap bomber parked in tight formation on apron. Best target they had ever seen - everybody in 14th thirsted over pix - Vincent was chief of staff then and he and old man plotted to get them - so near and yet so far - Suichwan wasn't ready yet and Kweilin was still just staging base - no fighters with enough range to get to Formosa fight and get back, only a handful of B-25s then too. Vincent never forgot the target. When for ech moved to Kweilin in May 43 they tried to check the target again - Formosa socked in tight - heavy clouds down to 4,500 feet. All summer long got no cover on account of wx - those exasperatingly fluffily thick clouds that look so beautiful from the round. Vicent went to states in Sept and returned Nov. 1.

In October Formosa finally cleared and they got cover of Shinch. More planes than ever. When Vincent got back he said "that's my meat I'm going to hit that" -- tried to get briefing coverage and failed - one engine quit on reason and wxed anyway. Early November weather cleared and began to get good coverage - over it so much in Nov. that afraid Japs would get suspicious - always over 26,000 feet not to alert. Fix showed dispersal area almost completed and planes still jammed on apron, building sand dune revetments too. target wouldn't be ripe much longer - got forecast of 3 days good weather at end of Nov. Vincent decided to strike. final photo cover. ~~Barber~~ xv

Barber did all P.I. work - Waves and negard did early overlay. Barber down to fine points - height of sand dunes, buildings and check points - tough check points because just south coast had similar series of check points. if made navigational error briefed how to correct and come in - no chance left for error on briefing. Smitty briefed flt leaders and Palmer briefed P-38's, Tex Hill the 51's and Wells the B-25's.

went to Suichwan late that afternoon - one mistake pilots wore bright yellow Mae Wests - for fighters that meant only one target - Formosa. bombers came in early next morning. - take-off delayed from 6 to 9:30 a.m. Boys in Kweilin and other bases sweated out mission on radio - no work, no lunch sweated out plots to coast and then silence. Code words - Boston - no good; NY canceled WX; San Antonio (Vincent's home town) o.k. expected flash at 1:30 p.m. no word - thought oh hell then nearly 3 p.m. got flash "San Antonio in a big way.

month later photos showed fox, holes revets, more flak and disperse planes.

interview by Capt. R.B. Hotz at Kweilin July 10, 1944

file Famous Famous records

Nov. 3.

Tenny. F-5 Skunk. 40 plows.

Nov 4. Tenny WX. gave. more for

recor. Tabou. Nov. 7

O K. gave. 8


13-20 WX. bad. —

Nov. 22 Sordelett. Skunk. 50 A/C.
WX clear with haze.

24 Sordelett 9:50 11:15 Skunk set 30
WX clear.

Nov. 25. Tenny 12:20 for WX. clear
weather land.

File Formosa



By Col. Clinton D. (Casey) Vincent
14TH AIR FORCE

THE Thanksgiving Day blasting of Formosa's Shinchiku airdrome was the deepest penetration of the internal communication and supply lines of the Japanese to be carried out by the 14th Air Force, and the most successful mission ever conducted against Jap aviation by our China-based planes.

Planned as a surprise raid with secret and meticulous care, the attack was executed without loss. Employing 29 aircraft, we destroyed 42 enemy planes and probably destroyed or damaged a dozen more in this first strike at Formosa.

With forecasts of but three days of good weather over the area within a month, the 14th Air Force jumped into high gear with a report from the weather detachment that Thanksgiving Day would be clear. On November 22 and 24 our reconnaissance planes brought back pictures of Shinchiku, revealing more than eighty aircraft, mostly medium bombers, on the field. On receipt of the first pictures we called together our tactical air staff and planned the day, approximate time, fighter and bomber strength and the bomb load of the mission.

On the morning of November 25, fourteen Mitchells, six from a Chinese-American squadron, took off from an advance base and kept rendezvous with fifteen fighters. The raiders then flew to the China Sea coast where they dropped down to skim over the whitecaps to avoid detection by Jap locators.

Success of our mission at that point

hinged on surprise which, in turn, depended upon perfect navigation. If spotted, the mission could turn into a costly failure since we were flying into a hornet's nest of Japanese air power.

Any anxiety, however, came to an end when we hit the Formosa coastline at precisely the right place and time. The fighters dropped their auxiliary fuel tanks and sped ahead in preparation for their battles. Bombers and the trailing formation of fighters climbed to 1,000 feet for their bombing and strafing attacks as the entire formation lined up on the target.

A squadron of P-38 fighters was leading, while the B-25s followed with their loads of fragmentation bombs. A fighter squadron came last to protect the Mitchells from rear attacks.

Upon approaching the target the P-38 leader spotted a lazy traffic pattern of ships waiting for landing instructions over the field. With his first flight, he joined the pattern, moved up on a bomber's tail, pressed the gun button on the stick, eased up behind another bomber, squeezed the button again, banked around to line up on a fighter just taking off and squeezed the button again. Score: three Jap planes destroyed. Meanwhile, his fellow pilots were knocking down other ships, accounting for nine by the time they had passed over the target.

So complete had been the surprise that by the time the second wave of P-38s charged over the field they noticed some 200 Jap mechanics just breaking for

cover. In a deadly buzz job, this flight blasted ten more enemy planes into flames.

B-25s then dropped their fragmentation bombs among the parked planes and scurrying mechanics. Three B-25s, banking away from the target, turned their guns on a barracks area and an engineer-gunner knocked down a Zero during the action. The last two Zeros in the air were shot down a moment later.

Despite smoke and flame over the target, the trailing fighter formation moved over the field and fired five more Jap bombers, probably destroyed a sixth and damaged at least three more.

In three minutes of fast action nineteen bombers, eight fighters, two transports and one Stuka dive bomber were destroyed, one bomber probably destroyed and three others damaged by gunfire in the air. Fragmentation bombs riddled and ignited between twenty and thirty other planes on the ground.

The only damage received by our planes were small arms hits on three B-25s and a bent wing on a fighter which hit a tree in its strafing run over the field.

Two Japanese versions of the raid were broadcast. One newscaster reported an attempted strike on Shinchiku airdrome in which the Japanese forced the raiders to turn back before reaching the field, shooting down two American aircraft. Another enemy radio report was less modest. This broadcaster reported that our bombers were forced to jettison their bombs before reaching the target and all, except one, were shot down. Such perverted claims were additional proof that the Japs had been severely jolted.

It was a perfect raid. ☆

'One of my boys'

By Capt. N. W. Pinney, Jr.

84TH BASIC FLYING TRAINING SQUADRON, GUNTER FIELD, ALA.

I WAS relaxing at the club last night after another six-hour, five-student flying period and just by chance I happened to see his name in the evening paper.

There was quite a headline telling about the big Ploesti raid, and in reading it I caught one name that was very familiar. The story said something about this pilot being one of the war's great aviators and mentioned that he had been flying a B-24 when his crew blasted their target to bits. I ran the name through my mind again and again, and at first I could not sort him out from the many students I had helped train. However, I knew he had been 'one of my boys' so I settled back comfortably and tried to recall him more clearly.

As I went back a year or so, I remembered him as a tall, skinny kid with an unruly mop of hair. He was always getting giggled for that hair, even if he *did*

get it cut once a week. When I first met him on the line he seemed such a young, awkward squirt that I wondered how he had ever gotten by the 64. However, what he lacked in good looks he more than made up in brains and memory, and he learned his procedures so well that I soloed him long before the others.

An instructor's thoughts after reading a headline.

It was one of those crisp autumn days when we shot those fateful duel landings at the auxiliary field. He managed to make enough fairly good ones to convince me he was ready for solo, so we stopped by the stage-house. I'll never forget seeing the sweat running down his neck when I got out and leaned into the rear cockpit to fasten the safety belt across the seat. I knew he'd probably be too nervous to remember to set the trim so I set it myself and tried to be as casual as possible when I climbed up to talk to him. "OK, now," I told him, "just

place your base leg where we've been putting it, remember to hold the nose level to slow her down when you cut the gun, give it throttle if you bounce high and, for God's sake, remember to reset the trim if you have to go around."

Well, the kid sat there moistening his lips and looking at me as if he were hearing the most important words since the Sermon on the Mount. I gave him a tap on the back and jumped off to walk over to the bench while he shot me a nervous look. Then he gave her the gun to taxi and dusted me off very nicely.

He took one hell of a long time to check his mags and I recall wondering if he was being unusually careful or just trying to screw up his courage to take off. Finally he did give it the gun (roughly as usual) and I remember cussing at him because it was cross-tee. I sweated him out all around the traffic pattern and, when he turned onto the base leg, I held my breath until he closed the throttle. He set her down *exactly* three-point, something he had rarely done with me, and taxied back to the stage-house with a mile-wide grin that said, "Hell, man, I can fly this thing!"

HE shot two more solo landings which he really greased in, and on the dual ride back home I hadn't had to say a word to him. He was obviously feeling his oats as I could catch scratchy strains of "Off we gooo, into tha wile blooo yonderr..." and I had a funny feeling he would be needing some deflating soon. Surely enough, he began to get a little cocky, his airwork started to go "in the pink," and

